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The thesis includes two essays. The ﬁrst essay, Inequality Moments in Estimation of
Discrete Games with Incomplete Information and Multiple Equilibria, develops a method
for estimation of static discrete games with incomplete information, which delivers consis-
tent estimates of parameters even when games have multiple equilibria. Every Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in a discrete game of incomplete information is associated with a set of choice
probabilities. I use maximum and minimum equilibrium choice probabilities as upper and
lower bounds on empirical choice probabilities to construct moment inequalities. In gen-
eral, estimation with moment inequalities results in partial identiﬁcation. I show that point
identiﬁcation is achievable if the payoﬀs are functions of a suﬃcient number of explanatory
variables with a real line domain and outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients associated with them.
The second essay, Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance, co-
authored with Richard Arnott, investigates the eﬀect of tenancy rent control on maintenance
and welfare. Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not
between tenancies. The essay analyzes the eﬀects of tenancy rent control on housing quality,
maintenance, and rehabilitation. Since the discounted revenue received over a ﬁxed-duration
tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce
up the unit between tenancies in order to show it well, but little incentive to maintain the
unit well during the tenancy. The essay formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical
examples illustrating the eﬃciency loss from this eﬀect.
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Part I
Inequality Moments in Estimation of
Discrete Games with Incomplete
Information and Multiple Equilibria
1 Introduction
Empirical industrial organization literature often employs discrete games as a convenient
tool, which allows to model interaction between economic agents and has an advantage
of clear interpretation of structural parameters. However, the use of games in empirical
applications requires a careful choice of appropriate econometric techniques. In particular,
it is often necessary to address the problem of multiplicity of equilibria, which is common
in discrete games.
The sources of equilibrium multiplicity and the solutions to this problem diﬀer depending
on the type of the game. In this essay, I suggest an estimator for a particular type of
discrete games, namely static discrete games with incomplete information and uncorrelated
unobservables. The proposed estimator delivers consistent estimates of parameters even
when games have multiple equilibria. Robustness to the presence of multiple equilibria
is achieved by using moment inequalities, which hold in any equilibrium, forming upper
and lower bounds on empirical choice probabilities. In general, estimation using moment
inequalities results in the set identiﬁcation of parameters. I show that point identiﬁcation
is achievable if i) payoﬀs are functions of a suﬃcient number of explanatory variables with
a real line domain and ii) these expanatory variables are associated with outcome-speciﬁc
coeﬃcients.
A static discrete game with incomplete information is a simultaneous move game, in
which players choose between a ﬁnite number of actions and each player has complete
knowledge of their own payoﬀs but only incomplete knowledge of other players' payoﬀs.
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Every Bayes-Nash equilibrium is associated with a set of equilibrium choice probabilities,
i.e. probabilities that a particular action is taken by a particular player in an equilibrium.
With multiple equilibria in the game, there are several sets of equilibrium choice probabil-
ities. I call an equilibrium choice probability extremal if it is a maximum or a minimum
one for a given player and action. Any equilibrium choice probability should lie between the
extremal ones. Also, an empirical choice probability, which is an estimate of the probability
that a particular action is taken by a particular player, should lie between the respective
extremal equilibrium choice probabilities. Empirical choice probabilities are not necessar-
ily consistent estimates of equilibrium choice probabilities. If the sample contains data on
outcomes of games where diﬀerent equilibria were played, empirical choice probabilities are
not the consistent estimates of equilibrium choice probabilities. Rather, they are weighted
averages of estimates of equilibrium choice probabilities associated with diﬀerent equilibria.
I suggest to estimate the payoﬀs of the game by using moment inequalities, which require
empirical choice probabilities to be smaller than maximal and greater than minimal equilib-
rium choice probabilities. Thus, even in the absence of consistent estimates of equilibrium
choice probabilities it becomes possible to estimate the parameters of the payoﬀ functions
consistently.
There is a growing industrial organization literature that models strategic interaction of
economic agents as discrete games and then takes them to data. The examples include the
studies of entry in small monopoly markets (Bresnahan and Reiss (1990)), entry and quality
choice of motels (Mazzeo (2002)), location choice by video retailers (Seim (2002)), timing
of radio commercials (Sweeting (2008)), welfare impact of environmental regulations of the
cement industry (Ryan (2006)), airlines' entry decisions (Aguirregabiria and Ho (2008))1. In
empirical applications it is assumed that games of similar structure (with the same number
of players and actions, same timing, and same information structure) are played in many
diﬀerent markets/moments of time. The economist observes some characteristics of the
players in each of these instances but does not fully know the payoﬀs. Usually it is assumed
that payoﬀs have a speciﬁc parametric form that depends on observables. Then the problem
1See Berry and Reiss (2006) for the review of the empirical industrial organization literature employing
discrete games.
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is to estimate the parameters of the payoﬀs knowing the observable characteristics of the
players and assuming the structure of the game. Essentially, the economist deals with a
series of games that have the same structure but diﬀerent payoﬀs.
The choice of information type of the game is made by the economist. In some cases,
economic agents are likely to know so much about each other that the game of complete
information should be employed. In other cases, it is plausible that agents possess important
conﬁdential information about their own payoﬀs, and incomplete information framework is
more appealing. As pointed out by Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2007), a discrete
game of incomplete information is a generalization of a single agent discrete choice model
such as logit or probit, bringing in the strategic interaction between agents. Additionally,
games of incomplete information may have some technical advantages, such as guaranteed
existence of equilibrium in pure strategies (Seim (2006) discusses these issues in the context
of static games and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007) in the context of dynamic games).
Payoﬀs in discrete games are usually modelled as functions of some observable charac-
teristics and of unobservable characteristics, which will be denoted ε. In games of complete
information ε is assumed to be unobservable to the economist but known to all players of
the game. In games of incomplete information unobservable characteristics εk of player k
are assumed to be unknown not only to the economist, but also to other players.
Both games of complete and incomplete information may have multiple equilibria. How-
ever, the structure of the equilibria is diﬀerent in two types of games, as well as the source of
the multiplicity of equilibria. In games of complete information, a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies is characterized by a proﬁle of actions. In contrast, in games of incomplete infor-
mation strategies are mappings from unobservables ε to actions, and equilibrium strategies
in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium are threshold-type rules. In games of complete information,
several equilibria may exist for some realizations of unobservables ε, and there can be such
realizations of ε that the equilibrium is unique. In games of incomplete information, the
number of equilibria is exactly the same for all realizations of ε, but there can be a unique
equilibrium for some realizations of observables and multiple equilibria for others.
Multiplicity of equilibria in games of incomplete information may lead to inconsistent
estimates of equilibrium choice probabilities if the economist does not know from which
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equilibrium each observation comes. Often economists do not have this information.
There are several approaches to avoid the multiplicity problem in discrete games. First,
it may be possible to concentrate on a particular equilibrium (e.g., Jia (2008) considers
extremal equilibria, Mazzeo (2002) speciﬁes the order of moves of the players, Berry (1992)
chooses the equilibrium which maximizes joint proﬁts of the ﬁrms, etc.) One more approach
is to assume that all data come from the same equilibrium (e. g., Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Pakes, Berry, and Ostrovsky (2007)). In
this case the economist may not know much about the equilibrium structure and relies on
data to tell which equilibrium is played, in contrast to the ﬁrst approach.
Yet another route is to model the selection mechanism as parameterized by some proba-
bility λ (which can be a function of some exogenous variables) and estimate this probability
along with other parameters (Sweeting (2008)). A version of this approach is to ﬁnd a vari-
able that shifts markets from one equilibrium to another (Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2008),
and Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2007)). Else one may be able to ﬁnd a feature
of the game, which is invariant across all equilibria and build the estimation around this
feature (Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Tamer (2003), Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008))2.
This essay contributes to the latter line of research with respect to static games of
incomplete information. My approach is to provide an estimation procedure which is robust
to the presence of multiple equilibria and remains valid without knowledge of `equilibrium
shifters'. In general, the refusal to assume that data come from a single equilibrium leads
to less eﬃcient estimates than in case of other approaches discussed above but the beneﬁt is
no misspeciﬁcation at the stage of modelling the selection mechanism or assumptions about
the equilibrium selection. This is a particular case of the tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and
robustness.
The essay has the following plan. Section 2 discusses the equilibrium structure in discrete
games with incomplete information. Section 3 describes the related econometric problem of
payoﬀs estimation in discrete games, proposes estimation strategy, and states identiﬁcation
conditions. Section 4 presents Monte Carlo analysis of the suggested estimator and Section
5 concludes.
2See Berry and Tamer (2007) for an overview of various strategies used for identiﬁcation in entry games.
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2 A discrete game with incomplete information
First, I describe a general case of a static discrete game with incomplete information and its
equilibrium structure, and then I illustrate the nature of equilibrium multiplicity in games
with incomplete information using an example of a binary game with two players.
2.1 General case
In empirical studies in industrial organization literature economists sometimes model inter-
action between economic agents as a game and then estimate the payoﬀs of this game. For
this purpose one needs to observe similar situations of interaction repeatedly. The most
studied example of such a case in the literature is ﬁrm entry in isolated geographic markets.
Clearly, two such markets, as well as their actual and potential entrants, will most certainly
diﬀer in their attributes. Still, one may be willing to assume that the entry in both markets
can be described by two games that have the same structure but diﬀer in their payoﬀ values.
For brevity sake, further I refer to such related games as repetitions of a game.
Consider several repetitions of a game, indexed by n = 1, 2, ..., N (in the entry example
above each repetition corresponds to a single market). Alternatively, one may think that a
series of N related games is observed. The relation between these games is described below.
In each repetition of the game there are K players, indexed by k. Each of the players
simultaneously chooses one of the M + 1 actions, ak ∈ {0, 1, ...,M}. An action proﬁle of
a game is described by vector a = (a1, a2, ..., aK), which belongs to the set of all possible
action proﬁles A = {0, 1, ...,M}K .
A payoﬀ of player k in repetition n of the game is modelled as a sum of two components:
uk,n(a) = vk,n(a) + εk,n(ak).
The ﬁrst of them, vk,n(a), depends on the actions of all players of the game and is perfectly
known to them. The second component, εk,n(ak) is assumed to come independently from
distribution F (·). εk,n(ak) depends only on actions of player k and is known only to him
before he makes a move in the game. One may interpret εk,n(ak) as a piece of private
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information about the payoﬀs associated with a particular action ak that player k in game
n receives before choosing an action. Other players know only the distribution of εk,n.
Abusing notation, I sometimes refer to εk,n instead of εk,n(ak). Also, it is convenient to
introduce εn = (ε1,n, ε2,n, ..., εK,n), which contains all private information for game n, and
ε−k,n, which contains private information for all players except player k. Similarly, I refer to
a−k = (a1, ..., ak−1, ak+1, ...ak) and to A−k = {0, 1, ...,M}K−1, a set, to which a−k belongs.
Without knowledge of ε−k,n, player k cannot perfectly predict actions to be chosen by
other players and has to resort to his expectation (belief) to observe particular actions of
other players a−k. I denote this belief by pik,n(a−k). The expected payoﬀ of player k from
choosing a particular action ak is
Uk,n(ak) =
∑
a−k∈A−k
[pik,n(a−k)vk,n(ak, a−k)] + εk,n(ak) (1)
where pik,n(a−k) is the belief held by player k that the actions a−k will be chosen by other
players in game n. Each player chooses an action maximizing his expected payoﬀ given his
beliefs pik,n(a−k) about choice probabilities of other players in game n:
δk,n = arg max
ak∈{0,1,...,M}
Uk,n(ak). (2)
Like ak, δk,n takes values from the set {0, 1, ...,M} but, unlike ak, δk,n is a payoﬀ-maximizing
action in game n, not an arbitrary action. In any Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the beliefs
pik,n(a−k) should be consistent with the (ex ante) probabilities to choose a particular action
(therefore, all players should have the same beliefs, so the pi's subscript k is dropped below):
pin(ak) = Pr[δk,n = ak], (3)
∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, ∀ak ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M}.
Notice that the right-hand side of (3) is a function of beliefs pin(a−k), as they aﬀect the
choice of the payoﬀ-maximizing action δk,n. Thus, one can treat (3) as a system of equations
that should be satisﬁed in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium and can be solved for pin(a). Further,
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a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (0, 0) (0, v2,0 − ε2)
a1 = 1 (v1,0 − ε1, 0) (v1,1 − ε1, v2,1 − ε2)
Table 1: Payoﬀs in a binary game with two players
I use a bar to denote the equilibrium beliefs: p¯i(a).
Depending on the form of F (·) as well as on the values of the payoﬀs, the system (3)
may have a unique or multiple solutions. I assume that there is some unobservable to the
economist variable(s) η, which does not aﬀect payoﬀs but allows players to coordinate on
a particular equilibrium in a given repetition of the game. Suppose there are En equilibria
in repetition n of the game. Then for each k = 1, 2, ...,K there exist En equilibrium beliefs
{p¯in,(1)(ak), p¯in,(2)(ak), ..., p¯in,(En)(ak)}, and among those one may choose the minimum and
maximum equilibrium beliefs for each particular player-action combination:
p¯in,min(ak) = min
q∈{1,2,...,En}
p¯i(q)(ak), (4)
p¯in,max(ak) = max
q∈{1,2,...,En}
p¯i(q)(ak).
I use this fact later in the estimation procedure.
2.2 Example: 2× 2 game with incomplete information
Using a simple game, I illustrate the issues with multiple equilibria in games of incomplete
information. Consider a game similar to the entry games studied by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990, 1991), Tamer (2003), Sweeting (2008), and Aradillas-Lopez (2008). To simplify the
exposition, I suppress the subscript n throughout this section and normalize the payoﬀs by
setting one payoﬀ of each player equal to zero (this leaves the action choices unaﬀected).
Also, I slightly simplify the notation compared to the general case.
There are two players, each making a choice between two actions, ak ∈ {0, 1}. The
players' payoﬀs are shown in Table 1.
Variables εk, k = 1, 2, are observed only by player k and unobserved by the other player;
εk comes independently from a distribution with the cdf F (·), which is known to both
players. As ε′s are private information in this setup, players cannot perfectly predict the
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actions of each other. They hold expectations about the behavior of the other based on their
knowledge of the distribution of ε's. I denote the belief of player k that the other player
chooses action 1 by pi−k. As this is a game with only two actions, player k's belief that the
other player chooses action 0 is equal to 1− pi−k.
Taking into account the unobservables εk, the expected payoﬀ of player k from choosing
action 1 is vk,1pi−k + vk,0(1 − pi−k) − εk. If ak = 0 the expected payoﬀ of player k is 0.
Therefore, the player k chooses action 1 if and only if
vk,1pi−k + vk,0(1− pi−k)− εk > 0.
The requirement that in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium the belief pik should be equal to the ex
ante probability that player k chooses action 1 results in the following system of equations:
pi1 = F (v1,0 + (v1,1 − v1,0)pi2) (5)
pi2 = F (v2,0 + (v2,1 + v2,0)pi1).
Thus, the decision of player k which action to choose depends on his belief about the behavior
of the other player, and vice versa. The system (5) states that the beliefs of the players
must be mutually consistent.
Even in this simple example, existence of multiple solutions to (5) is a general case.
For example, Sweeting (2008) shows that for a logit distribution of unobservables there
would be up to three symmetric equilibria in a version of this game. This fact highlights
the importance of the assumption about the common knowledge of F (·). Nevertheless, if
unobservables are distributed uniformly, there is only one equilibrium (Bajari et al., 2007).
Equation in the system (5) may be interpreted as two `best-response' functions that show
how the probability to choose action 1 by one player depends on the probability to choose
action 1 by the other player, pi1(pi2) and pi2(pi1). In Figure 1 several possible equilibrium
conﬁgurations are demonstrated in the space of beliefs (pi1, pi2).
Panels B and C show situations when the equilibrium is unique. Notice that in this
example the best response are continuous monotone functions. As a result, when one of the
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Panel A Panel B
Panel C Panel D
Figure 1: Diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations in games with two players and two actions
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best responses is increasing and the other is decreasing, only one equilibrium is possible.
When both best responses are either increasing, or decreasing (the former case is shown
in Panels A and B, and the latter in Panel D), the number of equilibria depends on the
distribution F (·) and payoﬀs. In panel A there are three equilibria, while in Panel B there
is a unique equilibrium labelled by p¯i∗ = (p¯i∗1, p¯i∗2).
3 Econometric problem
3.1 Observable variables
In cases when discrete games are employed in empirical work, a typical problem of the
economist includes estimation of the deterministic components of the payoﬀs vk,n(a). Usu-
ally it is assumed that vk,n(a) is a function of some observable (state) variables xn =
(x1,n, x2,n, ..., xK,n). Here xk,n is a row vector that contains observables aﬀecting the payoﬀs
of player k. These observable variables may include a constant, variables which diﬀer across
players (e.g., ﬁrm productivity), and variables common to all players in a given repetition of
the game (e.g., market size). All observations of state variables available to the economist
are denoted by x.
One approach to estimation of vk,n(a) is to treat it as a nonparametric function of
observables x (see Bajari et al. (2007) for the discussion of this issue). However, even if the
equilibrium is unique, nonparametric estimation of payoﬀs requires a formidable amount of
data. Moreover, there is an identiﬁcation problem as the number of payoﬀs vk,n(a) is larger
than the number of available restrictions. As a result, additional assumptions about the
structure of the problem are needed.
I follow an alternative approach to estimation of publicly known components of the
payoﬀs vk,n(a), which is based on a parametric speciﬁcation. I assume that a payoﬀ vk,n(a)
is a linear function of the observables:
vk,n(a) ≡ vk,n(a;xk,n, β) = xk,nβ(a), (6)
where β(a) ∈ B is a vector of parameters, which depends on the proﬁle of actions chosen by
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players, and B is a compact set. Thus, I assume that all coeﬃcients on observable factors
x may depend on action proﬁle a chosen by players. Those elements of β(a) that diﬀer
depending on a are called outcome-speciﬁc. For instance, in entry games and coordination
games it is often assumed that actions of other players aﬀect only a constant term of given
player's payoﬀ, which would make only one component of β(a) outcome-speciﬁc. In my
setup, I allow for multiple outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients.
Besides x, the economist observes actions δk,n, k = 1, 2, ...,K, and n = 1, 2, ..., N of all
players in all repetitions of the game. For brevity, all observations of actions stacked in a
single vector will be denoted by δ.
3.2 Normalization of payoﬀs
For each agent, a payoﬀ associated with action a = 0 is normalized to zero: vk,n(0, a−k) = 0
for k = 1, 2, ...,K. Indeed, adding the same constant to all payoﬀs of any agent does not
aﬀect the agent's choice of action. The action's choice depends only on the diﬀerence in
expected payoﬀs from diﬀerent actions, so the addition of a constant to all payoﬀs leaves
the choice of action unaﬀected. Since only actions but not payoﬀs are observed, there is no
way for the economist to pin down the level of payoﬀs and the normalization is necessary.
The same logic applies to the variance of εn, which cannot be identiﬁed separately from the
scale of β(a). Consequently, it is necessary to normalize variance of εn unless it is already
ﬁxed (e.g., extreme value distribution).
3.3 Distributional assumptions
It is assumed that unobservables εk,n are uncorrelated with the observables xn and are in-
dependently and identically distributed with a cdf function F (·) known to the players and
the economist. Aradillas-Lopez (2008) suggests an estimation procedure for the parameters
of two-by-two games with incomplete information (under the assumption of unique equilib-
rium) with nonparametric distribution of the error term. Some exclusion restrictions and
normalizations are used in this procedure. The potential presence of multiple equilibria
complicates the situation signiﬁcantly, and further I proceed with a parametric assumption
about the distribution of the unobservables εn.
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3.4 Estimation of the payoﬀs
The problem of the economist is to estimate β knowing x, δ, and the timing and structure
of the game. Assuming that in all repetitions of the game players use equilibrium strategies
implies the following set of equilibrium conditions:
p¯in(ak) = E[1{δk,n = ak}|x, η], (7)
∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, ∀ak ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M}
The economist observes actions δk,n of all players in all repetitions of the game. It would
be a straightforward task to estimate β using the equilibrium conditions (7) if one observed
the beliefs p¯in. Without them, one encounters the problem of potential multiplicity of solu-
tions to (7). While one may estimate empirical choice probabilities, they will not necessarily
be consistent estimates of equilibrium choice probabilities. In fact, if there are multiple
equilibria in data, empirical choice probabilities are consistent estimates of some weighted
average of equilibrium choice probabilities corresponding to diﬀerent equilibria. Further I
refer to this (population) weighted average as Eη[1{δk,n = ak}|x] where the unobservable
variable η essentially determines weights. As any weighted average of the equilibrium beliefs
is, by deﬁnition, smaller than the largest equilibrium choice probability and larger than the
smallest one, the following inequalities hold in any equilibrium:
p¯imin(ak;xn, β)− Eη[1{δk = ak}|xn] ≤ 0 , (8)
Eη[1{δk = ak}|x]− p¯imax(ak;xn, β) ≤ 0
∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, ∀ak ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M }
where p¯imin(ak;x, β) and p¯imax(ak;x, β) are deﬁned in (4) and (6) is used as the deﬁnition of
the publicly known component of the payoﬀs.
The inequalities (8) can be used to form moments
g(x, b) =
 gmin(x, b)
gmax(x, b)
 , (9)
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where gmin(x, b) and gmax(x, b) are vectors of the size (K ×M × Sx) with Sx being the car-
dinality of set x (i.e., Sx is the number of repetitions of the game with diﬀerent observables;
if there are two markets with the same observables xn = xr, it means that there are two
observations but only one unique game characterized by observables xn, so in that case Sx
is smaller than N). The elements of the vectors gmin(x, b) and gmax(x, b) have the following
form:
gk,ak,min(xs, b) = (p¯imin(ak;xs, b)− Eη[1{δk = ak}|xs])+ (10)
gk,ak,max(xs, b) = (Eη[1{δk = ak}|xs]− p¯imax(ak;xs, b))+
for k = 1, ...,K, ak = 1, ...,M, s = 1, ..., Sx (11)
where (x)+ = max(0, x).
The solution to the following minimization problem contains all parameters b that satisfy
(8):
B0 = arg min
b∈B
Q(x, b) (12)
where Q(x, b) = g(x, b)′g(x, b).
Here B0 may be a set estimate that contains true parameter β along with other b ∈ B
satisfying (10).
Applying the analog principle to the optimization problem stated above, I suggest the
following two-stage semiparametric procedure.
In the ﬁrst stage, the empirical choice probabilities pˆi are estimated non-parametrically.
One can use various techniques for this purpose, including sieve method, kernel method, or
local polynomial approximation method. It should be expected that parameter estimates
will be sensitive to the quality of the ﬁrst-stage estimates pˆi. Given the non-parametric
nature of these estimates, the larger the number of state variables in the model, the harder
it will be to obtain suﬃciently precise ﬁrst-stage estimates. This is an important practical
restriction on the size of games that can be estimated by the proposed method.
At the second stage, the sample analogs of (10) are formed with pˆi's standing for
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Eη[1{δk = ak}|xs]:
gˆn(x, b) =
 gˆmin(x, b)
gˆmax(x, b)
 (13)
gˆmin(x, b) = (p¯imin(ak;x, b)− pˆi(ak;x))+
gˆmax(x, b) = (pˆi(ak;x)− p¯imax(ak;x, b))+
and the sample analog Qˆ(x, b) of Q(x, b) is minimized to obtain the (possibly) set estimates
Bˆ0. The consistency of the proposed estimator will not be aﬀected and its eﬃciency may
be improved if moments are weighted. In particular, it seems reasonable to assign large
weight to inequalities that are associated with small diﬀerence between maximal and minimal
equilibrium beliefs and vice versa. Indeed, if p¯imin(ak;xs, b) = 0 and p¯imax(ak;xs, b) = 1 for
some speciﬁc xn and b, the inequalities employing these equilibrium beliefs do not provide
any information at all, because whatever empirical choice probabilities pˆi(ak;xs) are, the
inequalities in question will not be violated. Thus, such moments can be safely discarded
by assigning them zero weight. On the contrary, if p¯imin(ak;xs, b) = p¯imax(ak;xs, b) the
respective inequalities essentially amount to equality moments and should be given high
weights in estimation. I suggest using the estimator, which is similar to described above but
instead of (13) it employs weighted inequality moments:
gˆw,min(xs, b) = (p¯imin(ak;xs, b)− pˆi(ak;xs))+(1− (p¯imax(ak;xs, b)− p¯imin(ak;xs, b)))(14)
gˆw,max(xs, b) = (pˆi(ak;xs)− p¯imax(ak;xs, b))+(1− (p¯imax(ak;xs, b)− p¯imin(ak;xs, b))),
k = 1, ...,K, s = 1, 2, ..., Sx, .
In practical implementation of the estimators described in this section there is a necessity
to calculate p¯imin(ak;x, b) and p¯imax(ak;x, b) for each value of b. There is no explicit formula
for them, and, in general, ﬁnding all solutions to (7) is a diﬃcult problem. While more
detailed discussion of alternative methods to ﬁnd p¯imin(ak;x, b) and p¯imax(ak;x, b) is beyond
the scope of this essay, it should be pointed out the Bajari et al. (2007b) describe the
procedure to ﬁnd all equilibria for the case of the extreme value distribution of unobservables
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ε, using the `all-solutions' Homotopy continuation method.
3.5 Parameter identiﬁcation
Despite the fact that, in general, B0 is a set estimate and is obtained using the inequality
moments, it can be a point estimate in some circumstances. Indeed, it is possible that
under true parameters β for some values of state variables xs there is a unique equilib-
rium. In this case the relevant inequalities in (10) `tighten', eﬀectively acting as equalities.
Therefore, if the economist knew which xs characterize games with unique equilibria, he
could use these observations, essentially avoiding the problem of the potential multiplicity
of equilibria. But without knowledge of true β it is impossible to select such xs. In-
deed, p¯imin(ak;xs, b) and p¯imax(ak;xs, b) depend on b, and in general it can be the case that
p¯imin(ak;xs, β) = p¯imax(ak;xs, β) but p¯imin(ak;xs, b) < p¯imax(ak;xs, b). Still, if in the sample
there are observations of games with unique equilibria, it might be possible to achieve point
identiﬁcation of β.
Deﬁnition. It is said that β is identiﬁed relative to b ∈ B if there exists such x′ ∈ X,
k ∈ {1, ...,K}, and ak ∈ Ak that
p¯imax(ak;x
′, b) < p¯imin(ak;x′, β)
or
p¯imin(ak;x
′, b) > p¯imax(ak;x′, β).
Indeed, if this condition is satisﬁed, then it means that any weighted average of the
extremal equilibrium beliefs under parameter β is either smaller than the minimum equilib-
rium belief or greater than the maximum equilibrium belief under b at least for one action
of one player. Therefore, provided that a consistent estimate of Eη[1{δk = ak}|xs] is avail-
able, it will fall beyond the bounds suggested by using the candidate parameter b, which is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that b is the true data generating parameter.
It is hard to ﬁnd conditions that would guarantee identiﬁcation of β using the above
deﬁnition as there are no closed form expressions for the extremal equilibrium beliefs, but
the task becomes easier if there are unique equilibria under both β and b. Then it would be
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suﬃcient to show that
p¯imax(ak;x
′, b) = p¯imin(ak;x′, b) 6= p¯imin(ak;x′, β) = p¯imax(ak;x′, β). (15)
Thus, if it is possible to ﬁnd such x′ that (15) is satisﬁed, then β is identiﬁed relative
to b. It appears that if there is i) a suﬃcient number of state variables (which depends
on the number of players and number of actions in the game) that have suﬃciently large
domain and support and ii) coeﬃcients on these state variables are outcome-speciﬁc, it is
possible to ﬁnd such x′. The requirement of having suﬃcient number of outcome-speciﬁc
coeﬃcients is strong. Essentially it demands to make speciﬁc assumptions about the payoﬀs
that go beyond linear structure. Nevertheless, such assumptions may be quite plausible in
many cases. More importantly, the smaller the diﬀerence between these outcome-speciﬁc
coeﬃcients, the larger the domain of explanatory variables should be to identify them.
To understand how it is possible to choose such x′ that there is a unique equilibrium in
the relevant repetitions of the game, consider a choice probability for action ak if unobserv-
ables have extreme value distribution (which allows to integrate out unobservables from the
expression for an equilibrium choice probability):
p¯i(ak;xs, β) =
exp(
∑
a−k⊂A−k p¯i(a−k;xs, β)vk,s(ak, a−k;xk,s, β))
1 +
∑
aj∈A exp(
∑
a−k⊂A−k p¯i(a−k;xs, β)vk,n(aj , a−k;xk,s, β))
, (16)
∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, ∀ak ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M}, s = 1, 2, ..., Sx,
and notice that if the righthand side of (16) does not depend on p¯i(a−k) then only one value
value of p¯i(ak) will satisfy (16). If one can ﬁnd such x
′ that p¯i(a−k) cancel out in suﬃcient
number of equations in system (16), it will guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. Given
my speciﬁcation of the payoﬀs, the coeﬃcients on p¯i(a−k) in (16) are some linear combinations
of the values of the state variables x and parameters b. Setting them equal to zero, one
obtains a system of linear equations that can be solved for x. There is at least one solution
if there is a suﬃcient number of variables (which translates into the exclusionary restrictions)
and these variables have a suﬃciently large domain for the system to have a solution. Using
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a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 0, 0 0,
ν2βν + ξ2βξ,0
+ωβω,0 − ε2
a1 = 1
ν1βν + ξ1βξ,0
+ωβω,0 − ε1, 0
ν1βν + ξ1βξ,1
+ωβω,1 − ε1 ,
ν2βν + ξ2βξ,0
+ωβω,1 − ε2
Table 2: Payoﬀs in a binary game with two players
this system, one can determine precisely what the domain should be, given the compact
space of parameters B. In practice, the economist would know the domain and support for
the available observables and, using the same system, could determine which b's may be
distinguished from each other.
For the purposes of my proof, I divide all observables into three groups: x = [ν, ξ, ω]
(parameters β are split into βν , βξ, and βω, respectively). Observables ν include those
variables that do not have outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients on them at all. For example, in an
often employed speciﬁcation for an entry game payoﬀs where only a constant term depends
on the actions of the opponents, all other variables would be grouped in ν. Both ξ and
ω include variables that have outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients. The diﬀerence between them is
that the second group, ξ, includes player- and game-speciﬁc variables, while the third group
ω includes only game-speciﬁc variables (such as market size, for instance). Only ξ and ω
are used in my proof. The reason is that if a variable has the same coeﬃcient whatever the
proﬁle of actions is, it implies that this variable is not interacted with the beliefs about the
actions of other players because whatever they do, the eﬀect of this variable on the payoﬀ
does not change. As my proof relies on `varying' some state variables to ﬁnd a game with a
unique equilibrium, variables from ν are of no use for this purpose. It is also important to
note that having only an outcome-speciﬁc constant is not enough, because it does not vary.
Here I provide only a proposition regarding point identiﬁcation in a binary game with
two players and relegate a more general case for extreme value distribution of unobservables
εn,k(ak), K players and M + 1 actions to Appendix A as the exposition becomes extremely
cumbersome in the general case.
Continuing with the example discussed in Section 2.2 and the speciﬁcation of the payoﬀs
as described above, the payoﬀ matrix now looks as speciﬁed in Table 2.
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The system that determines equilibrium beliefs pik, k = 1, 2 that player k chooses action
1 takes the following form:
pi1 = F (ν1βν + ξ1βξ,0 + ωβω,0 + (ξ1(βξ,1 − βξ,0) + ω(βω,1 − βω,0))pi2) (17)
pi2 = F (ν2βν + ξ2βξ,0 + ωβω,0 + (ξ2(βξ,1 − βξ,0) + ω(βω,1 − βω,0))pi1).
This system has a unique solution if either of the following equations holds:
ξ1(βξ,1 − βξ,0) + ω(βω,1 − βω,0) = 0, (18)
or
ξ2(βξ,1 − βξ,0) + ω(βω,1 − βω,0)) = 0.
Indeed, if, for example, ξ1(βξ,1 − βξ,0) + ω(βω,1 − βω,0) = 0, then pi1 does not depend on pi2,
resulting in a unique solution for pi2.
Proposition 1. Suppose that in a simultaneous binary game of incomplete information
with two players indexed by k = 1, 2 and two actions characterized by a proﬁle a ∈ {0, 1} ×
{0, 1}, the payoﬀs of the players are as speciﬁed in Table 2 where ν1, ν2, ξ1, ξ2, and ω are row
vectors of observables and the Bayes-Nash concept of equilibrium is applied. If vectors i) ξ1,
and ξ2 have at least one continuously distributed element (with domain on R) associated with
outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients each, ii) ω has at least one element associated with outcome-
speciﬁc coeﬃcient, and iii) ν1 contains at least one continuously distributed element (with
domain on R) associated with a non-zero coeﬃcient, then for any b that satisﬁes the outcome-
speciﬁc requirement as stated above, b ∈ B, b 6= β, there exists a vector of observables x ∈ X
such that
pik,max(x, b) < pik,min(x, β) (19)
or
pik,min(x, b) > pik,max(x, β),
k = 1, 2
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and, therefore, β is identiﬁed relative to b ∈ B.
While the proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix A, the reasoning behind this
result goes as follows. Three explanatory variables required by the proposition are necessary
i) to guarantee a unique equilibrium under the true parameter β, ii) to guarantee a unique
equilibrium under any candidate parameter b and iii) to guarantee that these two equilibria
do not coincide (the outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients on these variables are necessary to insure
that variation in them indeed aﬀects the equilibrium beliefs).
If one is willing to assume some minimal diﬀerence in the outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients
on the explanatory variables required for the proposition, then one could limit the required
domain of the explanatory variables. If an equilibrium is unique, then the upper and lower
bounds on observed probabilities in (8) coincide, and unless they are the same under two
diﬀerent parameters, these parameters can be empirically distinguished from one another.
With a unique equilibrium, a frequency of an action should be almost surely equal to the
bounds under the true parameter (given unique equilibrium). If under every other candidate
parameter b the bounds do not coincide with those under the true parameter β, the diﬀerence
between the estimate of the expected frequency of actions and bounds will be minimized at
true β.
The idea of the proof is illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose that under some x ∈ X there are
three equilibria under both β and b. The panel A shows what happens when x′ is considered
instead of x. The probability of the ﬁrst player to choose action 1 does not depend on pi2 and
looks like a straight line on a graph.The Panel B of Figure 2 shows the what happens when
one explanatory variable is chosen so that there is a unique equilibrium under b. The third
regressor is used to guarantee that these two unique equilibria under diﬀerent parameter
values do not coincide.
Incidentally, if one is willing to assume some minimal diﬀerence between outcome-speciﬁc
coeﬃcients on the explanatory variable that are required for Proposition 2, one may limit the
domain of the explanatory variables required in Proposition 1. Consider a further simpliﬁed
example where ξ1, ξ2 and ω have one element each, and two parameters ∆βξ and ∆βω that
stand for the diﬀerences between outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients (similar to βξ,1 − βξ,0 and
βω,1 − βω,0). The conditions analogous to those used in the proof of Proposition 2 require
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Panel A Panel B
Figure 2
that
ξ1∆βξ + ω∆βω = 0
ξ2∆bξ + ω∆bω = 0.
Disregarding trivial (and useless for identiﬁcation purposes) zero solution, it is clear that if
domains of ξ1, ξ2 and ω are ﬁnite and ∆βω is ﬁxed, there is a limit on what absolute minimal
∆βξ can be.
When number of players and/or actions are greater than two, the nature of the require-
ments for a suﬃcient condition of point identiﬁcation is similar but the number of necessary
explanatory variables increases dramatically, as it is proportionate to both number of players
and number of actions, and the same requirements about the outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients
apply.
3.6 Consistency
A technically inconvenient property of the suggested estimator is that its objective function
is not continuous in the space of parameters B. Indeed, all moments include extremal beliefs
p¯imin(ak;x, b) and p¯imax(ak;x, b) which are not continuous in B but may have jumps at the
points where the number of equilibria changes. Together with the fact that, in general,
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the estimator provides set estimates, this makes the derivation of its asymptotic properties
a very diﬃcult problem. Here I only provide a proof of its consistency in case of point
identiﬁcation. Further I make use of a norm ‖·‖ on a ﬁnite-dimensional space.
Assumption 1. (Compactness.) The parameter space B is compact.
Assumption 2. (Identiﬁcation.) β is point identiﬁed: there is a unique β such that
g(x, β) = 0
where g(x, β) is deﬁned in (9). Moreover, for any δ > 0 and B(δ) = [b ∈ B : |b− β| ≥ δ]
inf
b∈B(δ)
||g(x, b)|| > 0
Practically this assumption means that for any b 6= β, b ∈ B at least one of the inequality
conditions (10) is violated, i.e. at least one of the elements of the vector g(x, β) is positive.
Assumption 3. (Random sampling.) The unobservables εk,n(ak), n = 1, ...,∞, k =
1, 2, ...,K are independent realizations from their distribution F (·).
Proposition 2. Assume that Assumptions 1-3 hold and the method of moments estimate
Bˆ0 is non-empty for all N. Then
lim
N→∞
sup
b∈Bˆ0
||b− β|| = 0, almost surely.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B, and here I only discuss the importance
of some of the assumptions and the main idea of the proof. The identiﬁcation is the most
crucial for the result. It says that for every parameter b diﬀerent from the true parameter
β there exists such xn in the sample that either p¯imin(ak;xn, b)−Eη[1{δk,n = ak}|xn] > 0 or
Eη[1{δk,n = ak}|xn]− p¯imax(ak;xn, b) > 0, which is a strong requirement. The compactness
of the parameter space is a technical assumption. The random sampling assumption is much
more restrictive but is maintained throughout this essay.
The logic of the proof is as follows. First, I prove a lemma that the uniform law of
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a2= 0 a2= 1
a1= 0 (0, 0) (0, β01+β11x2+β21z − ε2)
a1= 1 (β01+β11x1+β21z − ε1, 0) (β02+β12x1+β22z − ε1, β02+β12x2+β22z − ε2)
Table 3: Matrix of payoﬀs in the game used for Monte Carlo experiments
large numbers holds in this problem, so that limN→∞ supb∈B ||gˆn(x, b)− g(x, b)|| = 0 almost
surely. Then, I consider the compact sets B(δ) that expand as δ → 0. On each such set,
by the identiﬁcation assumption the inﬁmum of ||g(x, b)|| is greater than zero. Together
with the ULLN it implies that inﬁmum of gˆn(x, b) is also greater than zero on B(δ) for
suﬃciently large N . It also follows that inﬁmum of Qˆn(x, b) = gˆn(x, b)
′gˆn(x, b) is separated
from zero for suﬃciently large N . Therefore, Bˆ0 does not belong to B(δ) and should belong
to B −B(δ), which contracts to β as δ → 0, which concludes the proof.
4 Monte Carlo evidence
In this section, I present the results of simulations illustrating the performance of the sug-
gested estimator in a very simple setup. The model is a binary game with two players. The
payoﬀs of the players are given in Table 3.
I consider three setups that diﬀer in the number of unique xn observations and in the
version of estimator. In setup 1 1500 triples of (x1, x2, z) are randomly sampled and the
empirical choice probabilities are estimated using the kernel method with normal density
and bandwidths. In setups 2 and 3 a diﬀerent approach to constructing a sample is taken.
For each of the randomly chosen 150 xn points I draw 10 εn per player so as to see how the
ﬁrst stage estimates aﬀect the estimation. When there are several equilibria in the market,
I randomize between the extremal ones. The domains of x1 and x2 are [−80, 80] and the
domain of z is [−5, 5]. In setup 2 I use an unweighted method of moments estimator, and in
setup 3 I weight moments as described in (14). Table 4 shows the parameter values chosen
for the simulation as well as the estimates.
Surprisingly, while the average absolute error in the ﬁrst stage estimates thrice as high
in kernel setup 1 as in frequency setups 2 and 3, it is not clear that the quality of estimates
is signiﬁcantly worse in the former case. On the contrary, it is comparable for most of the
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Setup 1 Setup 2 Setup 3 True
β01 0.78 1.22 1.35 1
β11 1.40 0.95 1.00 1.2
β22 0.72 0.4 0.43 0.7
β02 -1.81 -1.97 -1.99 -2
β12 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.1
β22 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.5
N 1500 1500 1500
Percent of observations
with multiple equilibria
under true parameters
17% 18% 18%
Average absolute error
in empirical choice
probabilities
0.042 0.014 0.014
Table 4: True values of the parameters and the parameter estimates in 3 Monte Carlo setups
parameters, better for one of them, and worse for another one. Similarly, the performance of
the estimator in setups 2 and 3 is similar with slight improvements for most of the parameters
in setup 3 outweighed by its worse performance in case of β01.
5 Conclusion
This essay suggests a method of estimation of a simultaneous discrete choice static game
with incomplete information, which is robust to the presence of multiple equilibria in data. I
suggest using conditions that hold in any equilibrium. Since these conditions have the form
of inequalities, robustness usually comes at a price of point identiﬁcation. Still, it appears
that point identiﬁcation may be achievable if there are outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients on ex-
planatory variables, whose number is proportional to the number of players and actions in
the game. Further exploration of statistical properties of the proposed estimator is in order,
as well as ﬁnding a way to incorporate heterogeneity and correlation between unobservables
of the players.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof strategy is to show that for any parameter b ∈ B
it is possible to ﬁnd such observables ξ1, ξ2, ω ∈ x, x ∈ X that three conditions hold
simultaneously: the equilibrium under parameter β is unique; ii) the equilibrium under
parameter b is unique; iii) the equilibria under parameters β and b are diﬀerent:
pikmax(x, β) = pikmin(x, β) 6= pikmax(x, b) = pikmin(x, b), k ∈ {1, 2}. (20)
First the conditions are found that guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium under β and
under b; then, it is checked that the unique equilibria under β and b are diﬀerent.
Using (17), construct a system of equations that guarantees that equilibria under both
β and b are unique:
ξ1(βξ,1 − βξ,0) + ω(βω,1 − βω,0) = 0 (21)
ξ2(bξ,1 − bξ,0) + ω(bω,1 − bω,0) = 0
If ω has only one element and it is a constant, then (21) has at most one solution. If ω
does not include a constant, the system (21) has (inﬁnitely many) solutions if in the matrix
βξ,1 − βξ,0 0 βω,1 − βω,0
0 bξ,1 − bξ,0 bω,1 − bω,0

the vectors βξ,1 − βξ,0, bξ,1 − bξ,0, βω,1 − βω,0, and bω,1 − bω,0 have at least one non-zero
element each.
If it appears that given the chosen x
pikmax(x, β) = pikmin(x, β) = pikmax(x, b) = pikmin(x, b), k ∈ {1, 2},
it is possible to change ν1 so that it aﬀects only the equilibrium probabilities of the ﬁrst
player.
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Point identiﬁcation in a game with K players and M + 1 actions
Suppose that in a simultaneous game of incomplete information there are K players
indexed by k = 1, 2, ...,K, taking one of M + 1 actions characterized by a proﬁle a ∈
{0, 1, ...,M}K , and receiving private signals εk,n distributed independently according to the
extreme value distribution. The expected payoﬀ of player k from taking action ak is
∑
a−k⊂A−k
p¯i(a−k;xn, β)vk,n(ak, a−k;xk,n, β) + εk,n(ak)
and the equilibrium choice probabilities satisfy the following conditions:
p¯i(ak;xn, β) =
exp(
∑
a−k⊂A−k p¯i(a−k;xn, β)vk,n(ak, a−k;xk,n, β))
1 +
∑
aj∈A
aj 6=0
exp(
∑
a−k⊂A−k p¯i(a−k;xn, β)vk,n(aj , a−k;xk,n, β))
, (22)
∀k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, ∀ak ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M}, n = 1, 2, ..., N.
Let's arrange all observables into three groups: x = [ν, ξ, ω] (parameters β are arranged,
respectively, into βν , βξ, and βω). Observables ν include those variables that do not have
outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients at all. Both ξ and ω include variables that have outcome-
speciﬁc coeﬃcients, with ξ including player and game (market) speciﬁc variables and with
ω including only game speciﬁc variables (such as market size). Then the expected payoﬀ of
player k from taking action ak can be rewritten as follows:
∑
a−k⊂A−k
p¯i(a−k;x, β)vk,n(ak, a−k;xk, β) + εk(ak) (23)
= νkβν + p¯i(a˜−k;x, β)(ξkβξ(a˜−k) + ωβω(a˜−k) + εk(ak)
+
∑
a−k⊂A−k
a−k 6=a˜−k
(p¯i(a−k;x, β)− p¯i(a˜−k;x, β)) [ξk(βξ(a−k)− βξ(a˜−k)) + ω(βω(a−k)− βω(a˜−k)]
where a˜−k is some action proﬁle of all the players except for the kth. From the above formula
it is clear that if
ξk(βξ(a−k)− βξ(a˜−k)) + ωn(βω(a−k)− βω(a˜−k) = 0
for all a−k ⊂ A−k, a−k 6= a˜−k,
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then the expected payoﬀ of player k from choosing action ak does not depend on the strate-
gies of others. The form of (22) suggests that if there are (ξk, ω) that solve the system of L
equations (L is the number of elements in A−k minus one)
ξk(βξ(a−k)− βξ(a˜−k)) + ω(βω(a−k)− βω(a˜−k)) = 0, (24)
a−k ⊂ A−k, a−k 6= a˜−k
then there is a unique vector of equilibrium beliefs p¯i(ak;xn, β) for player k. Analogously,
given parameters b, divided respectively into bν , bξ, and bω, there is a system of L equations
similar to (24):
ξk(bξ(a−k)− bξ(a˜−k)) + ω(bω(a−k)− bω(a˜−k)) = 0, (25)
a−k ⊂ A−k, a−k 6= a˜−k (26)
Suppose that i) vectors ξ1 and ξ2 have at least L (cardinality of A−k minus one) and, if
K > 2, ξk, k = 3, ...,K, each have at least 2L continuously distributed components (with
domain on R) associated with outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcients, and denote vectors that contain
only these components, respectively, ξ˜1, ξ˜2,..., ξ˜K ; ii) vector ω has at least one component
associated with outcome-speciﬁc coeﬃcient and denoted by ω˜ and iii) vector ν1 contains at
least one continuously distributed element (with domain on R) element associated with non-
zero coeﬃcient and denoted by ν˜1. Denote the coeﬃcients associated with ξ˜k, k = 1, 2, ...,K,
and ω˜ in (24) by, respectively, β˜ξ(a−k) − β˜ξ(a˜−k) and β˜ω(a−k) − β˜ω(a˜−k) and in (25) by,
respectively, b˜ξ(a−k)− b˜ξ(a˜−k) and b˜ω(a−k)− b˜ω(a˜−k). Let's rewrite (24) and (25) together
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in matrix form:
Bξ,1 0 ... 0 0 Bω,1
0 Bξ,2 ... 0 0 Bω,2
... ... 0 ...
0 0 ... Bξ,K−1 0 Bω,K−1
0 B˜ξ,2 ... 0 0 B˜ω,2
... ...
0 0 ... B˜ξ,K−1 ...
0 0 ... 0 B˜ξ,K B˜ω,K


ξ1,n
ξ2,n
...
ξK−1,n
ξK−,n
ωn

= 0,
where matrix Bξ,k contains coeﬃcients βξ(a−k)−βξ(a˜−k), B˜ξ,k contains coeﬃcients b˜ξ(a−k)−
b˜ξ(a˜−k), Bω,k contains coeﬃcients βω(a−k)−βω(a˜−k), and B˜ω,k contains coeﬃcients b˜ω(a−k)−
b˜ω(a˜−k) with the rows corresponding to a−k ⊂ A−k, a−k 6= a˜−k. If rank(Bξ,1) = rank([Bξ,1
Bω,1]), rank(B˜ξ,K) = rank([B˜ξ,K B˜ω,K ]), rank

Bξ,k
B˜ξ,k

 = rank

Bξ,1 Bω,1
B˜ξ,k B˜ω,1

, then
there is a unique equilibrium given parameters β and there is a unique equilibrium given
parameters b. If they coincide for all actions and players, one can use ν1 to aﬀect equilibrium
under β but not under b. This would guarantee that β can be distinguished from b.
Appendix B
Lemma. Assumptions 1 and 3 imply the uniform law of large numbers (ULLN):
lim
N→∞
sup
b∈B
||gˆn(x, b)− g(x, b)|| = 0, a.s.
where gˆn(x, b) is deﬁned in (13) and g(x, b) is deﬁned in (9).
Proof. Consider b ∈ B and a particular element of vector gˆn(x, b)−g(x, b), for example,
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gˆmax(xn, b)− gmax(xn, b):
gˆmax(xn, b)− gmax(xn, b)
= pˆi(ak;xn)− pimax(ak;xn, b)− Eη[1{δk,n = ak}|xn] + pimax(ak;xn, b)
= pˆi(ak;xn)− Eη[1{δk,n = ak}|xn]. (27)
The similar cancellations occur within any element of gˆn(x, b) − g(x, b), so neither of them
depend on b. Therefore, ||gˆn(x, b)− g(x, b)|| does not depend on b and depends only on true
parameter β. From assumption of Random Sampling and the strong law of large numbers
it follows that for any η > 0 there almost surely exists a ﬁnite Nη such that for N > Nη
max
b∈Bη
||gˆn(x, b)− g(x, b)|| < η. (28)
Due to (27), (28) is true for any b ∈ B. As η → 0, the lemma's claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 1 (Ch. 7) in
Manski (1987).
Recall that B(δ) = [b ∈ B : ||b − β|| ≥ δ]. Fix δ and denote ε = infb∈B(δ) ||g(x, b)||. By
the identiﬁcation assumption, ε > 0. Given that and the fact that, by condition of ULLN
proved in Lemma above,
lim
N→∞
sup
b∈B
||gˆn(x, b)− g(x, b)|| = 0, a.s.,
it follows that there almost surely exists a ﬁnite N2 such that if N > N1, then
inf
b∈B(δ)
||gˆn(x, b)|| > ε/2.
Also, let's introduce an origin-preserving transformation r(T ) = T ′T and η = inf ||T ||>ε/2 r(T ).
By construction of the transformation, η > 0. Therefore, if N > N1
inf
b∈B(δ)
r [gˆn(x, b)] > η > 0.
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From the identiﬁcation assumption, ULLN, and the properties of r(·) it follows that there
almost surely exists a ﬁnite N2 such that if N > N2, then
r [gˆn(x, b)] < η.
Therefore, for N > max(N1, N2)
Bˆ0 ⊂ B −B(δ).
Thus, if δ → 0, B −B(δ) contracts to β, which completes the proof.
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Part II
Tenancy Rent Control and
Credible Commitment in Maintenance
(co-authored with Richard Arnott)
1 Introduction
Tenancy rent control is a form of rent control in which rents are regulated within a tenancy
but may be raised without restriction between tenancies; more speciﬁcally, the starting rent
for a tenancy is unregulated but the path of nominal rents within a tenancy, conditional on
the starting rent, is regulated, typically causing rents to rise less rapidly over the tenancy
than they would in the absence of controls3. Many, perhaps most, jurisdictions around the
world that previously had traditional ﬁrst- and second-generation rent control programs
(Arnott (1995)) have moved in the direction of tenancy rent control as a method of partial
decontrol4.
In jurisdictions that have stricter forms of rent control, tenancy rent control may be an
attractive method of partial decontrol. Because the starting rent adjusts to clear the market,
tenancy rent control does not generate the excess demand phenomena (such as key money,
waiting lists, and discrimination) of stricter rent control programs, and should have less
adverse eﬀects on tenant mobility and the matching of households to housing units5. Tenancy
3This deﬁnes the ideal type, which is what will be modelled in this paper. Many jurisdictions have
forms of rent control that are intermediate between tenancy rent control, according to the above deﬁnition,
and more traditional forms of rent control. In some, rent increases are regulated both within and between
tenancies, but less severely between tenancies than within tenancies. In others, rent increases are unregulated
between tenancies but are subject to a variety of regulatory provisions within a tenancy, such as a guideline
rent increase (which allows rents to rise by a certain percentage per year) with a cost-pass through provision
(which allows the landlord to apply for a rent increase above the guideline rent increase if justiﬁed by cost
increases).
4Basu and Emerson (2000, 2003) and Arnott (2003) list some of these jurisdictions. Borsch-Supan (1996)
models the current German system and Iwata (2002) the current Japanese system, both of which are termed
tenant protection systems.
5There is a large literature on the adverse eﬀects of rent control. Three particularly good papers that
avoid polemical rent-control bashing are Frankena (1975), Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), and Olsen (1988).
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rent control continues to provide sitting tenants with improved security of tenure; for one
thing, rent regulation within tenancies precludes economic eviction; for another, because
tenancy rent control, like other forms of rent control, provides landlords with an incentive
to evict tenants, it is invariably accompanied by conversion (rehabilitation, demolition and
reconstruction, and conversion to condominium) restrictions6. As well, tenancy rent control
may be a politically attractive method of partial decontrol since it continues to provide rent
protection to sitting tenants, who are typically the strongest opponents of decontrol. These
beneﬁts must be weighed against the costs. The most obvious costs are the tenant lock-in
created by tenancy rent control and the unfairness of the preferential treatment of sitting
tenants. There are also less obvious costs. The workability of tenancy rent control makes it
more diﬃcult to move to complete decontrol, should this be deemed desirable. Also, because
a rent control administration is kept in place, it is relatively easy to return to harder controls
should the political winds change. Landlords, fearing this, may curtail investment7.
This paper focuses on another less obvious cost of tenancy rent control  its adverse
eﬀect on maintenance, construction, demolition and reconstruction, and rehabilitation. Pol-
lakowski (1999) provides an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of New York City's rent control
system on housing maintenance there. Arnott and Johnston (1981) provides an informal,
diagrammatic discussion of the eﬀects of several rent control programs (though not ten-
ancy rent control) on housing quality and maintenance. This paper will adapt the model of
Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) to examine how the application of tenancy rent control
to a single atomistic landlord-builder aﬀects his proﬁt-maximizing behavior8.
Assume, as we will throughout the paper in order to abstract from the tenant lock-in
eﬀect, that tenancy duration is exogenous. There are two conﬂicting intuitions concerning
the eﬀects of tenancy rent control on the atomistic landlord's behavior. A lay person with
good economic intuition would probably argue that tenancy rent control gives the landlord
6Miron and Cullingworth (1983) and Hubert (1991) examine the eﬀects of rent control on security of
tenure.
7These less obvious costs are evident in the Ontario experience with rent control (e.g., Smith, 2003).
8Since the analysis is very partial equilibrium, it will ignore the eﬀects of tenancy rent control on the
level of rents and on other markets such as the labor market.
While the paper focuses on tenancy rent control, the techniques employed can be applied to examine the
eﬀects of other forms of rent control on the landlord's optimal program (indeed, Arnott and Johnston (1981)
does so, albeit informally).
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an incentive to spruce up his units between tenancies so that they show well and hence
can be let at a higher starting rent, but little incentive to maintain the units well during
tenancies since, after the starting rent has been agreed upon, maintaining well has no eﬀect
on the rent stream during the tenancy. An economist might however reasonably object that,
with tenancy duration exogenous, there is nothing to prevent the landlord from following the
program that is proﬁt maximizing in the absence of tenancy rent control  which we shall
term the eﬃcient program. If the landlord follows this program, the tenant should be willing
to pay as much over her tenancy as she would have for an uncontrolled unit. This line of
reasoning suggests that, were it not for the tenancy lock-in, the landlord's proﬁt-maximizing
program would be unaﬀected by the application of tenancy rent control.
The resolution of the two conﬂicting intuitions lies in the ability of the landlord to
credibly commit to the eﬃcient program. If he is able to credibly commit to a maintenance
program, he will credibly commit to the eﬃcient program and the tenant will agree to pay
the same in rent in discounted terms over the duration of the tenancy as in the absence of
rent control. The landlord will therefore be making the same revenue and incurring the same
costs as in the absence of rent control, and can surely do not better than this. If, however,
the landlord is unable to credibly commit to pursuing the eﬃcient program, once the lease
is signed he has an incentive to pursue a diﬀerent maintenance program, which we term the
opportunistic program. Since the signing of the lease ﬁxes the discounted rent the landlord
will receive over the current tenancy, the only incentive he has to maintain is to improve the
quality of the unit at the end of the lease, as this will increase the discounted rent he receives
on subsequent tenancies. Compared to the eﬃcient program, the opportunistic program
entails both a reduction in average maintenance and a postponement of maintenance within
a tenancy. Before the lease is signed, a prospective tenant should in this situation realize
that under tenancy rent control the landlord will pursue the opportunistic rather than the
eﬃcient maintenance program and hence not be willing to pay as high a starting rent as she
would if he were to pursue the eﬃcient program.
The crux of the matter is therefore the landlord's ability, under tenancy rent control,
to commit to a particular maintenance program. Three commitment mechanisms might be
partially eﬀective. The ﬁrst is contracting on maintenance. One problem with this com-
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mitment mechanism is that, since maintenance is such an amorphous concept, maintenance
clauses in the lease would be highly incomplete; for example, if the contract were to re-
quire the landlord to replace appliances every ten years, he might replace with appliances
that are used and reconditioned or of minimal quality. Another problem is that it would
be costly for a tenant to document that her landlord had not met the maintenance terms
of the contract. The second commitment mechanism, reputation, is likely to be ineﬀective
since the typical prospective tenant knows little or nothing about diﬀerent landlords' main-
tenance performance when she is searching for a unit. The third mechanism, maintenance
regulation, suﬀers from problems similar to those for contracting on maintenance. In our
judgment, such commitment devices are generally ineﬀective, and in our analysis we shall
assume them to be completely ineﬀective. The eﬃciency costs that we identify are reduced
to the extent that these commitment mechanisms are indeed eﬀective.
Section 2 analyzes the landlord's proﬁt-maximizing program in the absence of rent con-
trol. Section 3 examines how tenancy rent control in the absence of credible commitment
in maintenance distorts the proﬁt-maximizing program. Section 4 provides some calibrated
examples focusing on the magnitude of the eﬃciency loss caused by tenancy rent control.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Proﬁt-Maximizing Program without Rent Control
A competitive landlord owns a vacant lot of ﬁxed area on which only a single unit of housing
can be constructed9. Housing is durable and its quality is endogenous. Four quality-changing
technologies are available: construction, maintenance, rehabilitation, and demolition. The
economic environment is stationary over time and described by the quality-changing tech-
nologies, the rent function relating market rent to quality, and the interest rate. The main-
tenance technology is autonomous  the unit's rate of quality change depends on its current
quality and the current level of maintenance expenditure but not on the unit's age per se.
The landlord chooses the proﬁt-maximizing program. Under these assumptions, phase plane
analysis may be employed.
9The analysis can be extended to endogenize structural density (Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1986)).
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A rather thorough analysis of this problem is presented in Arnott, Davidson, and Pines
(1983). Here we focus on a special  but also probably the most realistic  case, in which, in
the absence of controls, at the beginning of the program it is proﬁt maximizing to construct
and downgrade. Three qualitatively diﬀerent active programs may be proﬁt maximizing:
1. Initial construction, followed by downgrading to saddlepoint quality (program S).
2. A construction-downgrading-demolition cycle (program D).
3. Initial construction followed by a downgrading-rehabilitation cycle (program R).
2.1 Program S
Under program S, at time 0 the landlord constructs a single housing unit of quality qc on
his lot and then downgrades the unit asymptotically to saddlepoint quality qS . Where q(t)
is quality at time t, P (q) the exogenous rent function, m(t) maintenance expenditure at
time t, r the interest rate, α construction cost per unit of quality, g(q,m) the depreciation
function, and T the terminal time, the proﬁt-maximizing program is the solution to
max
qc,m(t)
∞´
0
(P (q (t))−m (t)) e−rtdt− αqc
i) q˙ = g (q,m)
s.t. ii) qc ≡ q (0) free
iii) limT↑∞ q (T ) free
(29)
Note that quality is measured as some fraction of construction costs, and that tenant mainte-
nance is not considered. We impose non-negativity conditions on q and m. Where ′s denote
derivatives and subscripts partial derivatives, we also impose reasonable restrictions on the
functions P and g: i) P (0) = 0, P ′(q) > 0 and P ′′(q) < 0; and ii) gq < 0, gm(q, 0) = ∞,
g(q, 0) < 0, gm(q,∞) = 0, gm > 0, gmm < 0. Thus, rent increases with quality but at a
diminishing rate; there are positive but diminishing returns to maintenance; holding ﬁxed
the rate of quality deterioration, more has to be spent on maintenance as quality increases;
and with zero maintenance, the unit deteriorates. In our numerical examples, the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the S program will deﬁne a unique interior maximum.
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We solve the problem using optimal control theory (Kamien and Schwartz (1991)). The
current-value Hamiltonian corresponding to (29) is
H◦ = P (q (t))−m (t) + φ (t) g (q (t) ,m (t)) , (30)
where φ(t) is current-value co-state variable on
·
q = g (q,m) . The ﬁrst-order condition10 for
maintenance is
−1 + φ (t) gm (q (t) ,m (t)) = 0. (31)
Since φ(t) is the marginal value of quality at time t, and gm(q(t),m(t)) the amount by which
quality is increased by an extra dollar's expenditure on maintenance, φgm is the marginal
beneﬁt from maintenance. Thus, at each point in time, maintenance should be such that
marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost. The conditions imposed on gm guarantee that there
is a unique, interior optimal level of maintenance expenditure for all non-negative values of
q and φ; thus, we may write m = m(q, φ) with mφ > 0. Inserting this function into (30)
yields the maximized current-value Hamiltonian:
H (q, φ) = P (q)−m (q, φ) + φg (q,m (q, φ)) . (32)
The equation of motion of the co-state variable is
·
φ = rφ−Hq = rφ− P ′ − φgq. (33)
The assumptions thus far have not ruled out the possibility that the optimal saddlepoint
program entails upgrading to saddlepoint quality via maintenance alone. We assume that the
maintenance and construction technologies are such that the optimal saddlepoint program
entails construction at the start of the program. The transversality condition with respect
to qc is then
φ (0) = α; (34)
10Throughout the analysis we shall omit second-order conditions as we compare the proﬁt-maximizing
programs with and without rent controls, for which the second-order conditions will hold. We shall also omit
non-negativity conditions. In the numerical examples of section 4, we explicitly verify that non-negativity
conditions hold.
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Figure 1: Phase plane for construction with downgrading to the steady state. Construction
cost (α · 105) is $60,000.
construction quality should be increased up to the point where the marginal value of quality
equals its marginal cost.
We are now in a position to construct the phase plane corresponding to this program.
We assume that: i) the q˙ = 0 locus is positively sloped; ii) the φ˙ = 0 locus is negatively
sloped; and iii) the q˙ = 0 locus and φ˙ = 0 locus intersect in the positive orthant. Thus,
there is a unique saddlepoint, S = (qS , φS). We assume furthermore that φS > α, unless
otherwise noted. Figure 1 displays a phase plane consistent with these assumptions. As is
the case for all the ﬁgures, Figure 1 is drawn for the functional forms and parameters used
in the series of numerical examples presented in Section 4.
We also have the inﬁnite horizon transversality conditions associated with terminal qual-
ity and terminal time. Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) proves that, under the assump-
tions made, these conditions imply that the optimal trajectory must terminate at the sad-
dlepoint. Putting together the necessary conditions for optimality, we obtain that the S
program entails construction at that quality at which the right stable arm intersects the φ
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= α line, followed by downgrading along the stable arm to the saddlepoint.
For an autonomous optimal control problem with discounting, the value of the program
at any time along an optimal trajectory equals the value of the Hamiltonian at that time
divided by the interest rate:
V (t) =
H (q(t), φ(t))
r
.
The economic interpretation is that the value of the Hamiltonian gives the economic
return per unit time from owning the program, which includes the net (of expenses and
depreciation) earnings stream it generates plus capital gains, and competitive asset pricing
requires that the net return per unit time from owning an asset equal the asset price times
the discount rate.
With some abuse of notation, we denote the value of the maximized Hamiltonian at a
point labeled X in the phase plane by H(X). The value of the program immediately after
initial construction is then H(A)r , so that the value of the program immediately before initial
construction, which is the value of the S program, is V S = H(A)r − αqA.
2.2 Program D
Consider next program D, which entails a construction-demolition cycle, where qs is the
starting quality for each cycle. The landlord's proﬁt-maximizing program is the solution
to11
max
qs,qT ,T,m(t)
1
1− e−rT
{
T´
0
(P (q (t))−m (t)) e−rtdt− αqs
}
i)
·
q = g (q,m)
s.t. ii) qs ≡ q (0) free
iii) qT ≡ q (T )free
iv) T free
(35)
Let J(qs, qT , T ) denote the maximized value of the expression in curly brackets, which is the
present value of net revenue from a single cycle as a function of qs, qT , and T . Then (35)
11The analysis can be straightforwardly extended to treat demolition costs.
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can be rewritten as
max
qs,qT ,T
1
1− e−rT J (qs, qT , T ) .
We assume that the D program entails construction at the beginning of each cycle. Eqs.
(30) through (34) continue to apply. The transversality condition for qT is
φ(T )q(T ) = 0, (36)
which indicates that the building's quality should be run down until the optimal trajectory
intersects one of the axes in the phase plane. If the optimal trajectory intersects the q-
axis, as will be the case in all our numerical examples, the condition is that φ(T ) = 0; the
building's quality should be run down until, at the end of the cycle, the marginal value of
quality is zero. The transversality condition for T is
H (q (T ) , φ (T )) + rαqs = H (q (0) , φ (0)) ; (37)
the left-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt from postponing demolition and reconstruction,
the right-hand side the marginal cost. We can provide a useful geometric depiction of this
transversality condition. Now,
H (q (0) , φ (0))−H (q (T ) , φ (T )) =
qsˆ
qT
(
Hq +Hφ
(
dφ
dq
))∗
dq,
where ∗ indicates evaluation along a phase plane trajectory connecting the starting and end
points. Since (dφ/dq)∗ =
( ·
φ
·
q
)∗
and Hφ = ·q, using (33) the above expression reduces to
H (q (0) , φ (0))−H (q (T ) , φ (T )) =
qsˆ
qT
rφ∗ (q) dq. (38)
Combining (37) and (38) gives
αqs =
qsˆ
qT
φ∗ (q) dq. (39)
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Figure 2: Phase plane for a construction-demolition cycle. Construction cost (α · 105) is
$30,000.
Figure 2 displays the phase plane for a D program. As drawn, the trajectory CDEF satisﬁes
the three transversality conditions: it starts on φ = α, it terminates at φ = 0, and it satisﬁes
(37). Eq. (39) has the interpretation in the phase plane that the area under the optimal
trajectory from the starting to the end point equals αqs, that Area ZCDEF = Area OXCZ.
Subtracting the common area ZCEF from both these areas gives the equivalent condition
that Area CDE = Area OXEF. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a
trajectory that satisﬁes all three transversality conditions is that Area ASW > Area OXWB,
where SWB is the unstable arm from the saddlepoint to its intersection with the q- or φ-axis,
as the case may be. We refer to this as the D-areas condition. If the D-areas condition is
satisﬁed, we say that a D program exists, and if it is not that a D program does not exist.
Since increasing α decreases Area ASW and increases Area OXWB, there is a critical value
of α, above which the D-areas condition is not satisﬁed, and below which it is. Thus, a D
program exists for construction costs below a critical level, but not otherwise.
If a D program exists, which is more proﬁtable, the D program or the S program? We
have already demonstrated that the value of the S program immediately prior to construction
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is V S = H(A)r − αqA. An analogous line of reasoning establishes that the value of the D
program is V D = H(C)r −αqC . Now, HA −HC =
´ qA
qC
Hq (q, α) dq =
´ qA
qC
(
rα−
·
φ
)
dq (from
(33)). Thus,
(
HA
r − αqA
)
−
(
HC
r − αqC
)
=
´ qA
qC
−
·
φdq along φ = α, which can be seen to
be negative. Thus, if a D program exists, it is more proﬁtable than the S program. It can
also be shown that if a D program does not exist, the optimal S program is more proﬁtable
than any construction-demolition cycle program. Thus, the construction-demolition cycle
program is more proﬁtable than the saddlepoint program when construction costs are below
the critical value, and the saddlepoint program is more proﬁtable than any construction-
demolition cycle program when construction costs are above the critical value, which accords
with intuition.
2.3 Program R
The ﬁnal option is a rehabilitation cycle, which entails constructing at quality qc, down-
grading to quality qT , rehabbing up to quality qs, and then repeating the downgrading-
rehabilitation cycle. Discounted net rents
max
qc,qs,qT ,Tc,T,m(t)
Tcˆ
0
(P (q (t))−m (t)) e−rtdt− αqc
+
e−rTc
1− e−rT
 Tˆ
0
(P (q (t))−m (t)) e−rtdt−R (qs, qT )
 ,
are maximized with respect to qc, qs, qT , Tc, T, and m (t) where Tc is the length of time from
construction to the ﬁrst rehab, T the length of the rehabilitation cycle, and R (qs, qT ) the
cost of rehabbing a unit of quality qT to quality qs. It is assumed that it remains proﬁtable to
construct initially, so that (31) through (34) continue to apply. The transversality conditions
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Figure 3: Phase plane for a rehabilitation cycle. Construction cost (α · 105) is $20,000.
are
qc : φc = α
T : H (qT , φT ) + rR (qs, qT ) = H (qs, φs)
qs : φ (0) = φs =
∂R
∂qs
qTc , qT : φ(Tc) = φ(T ) = φT =
∂R
∂qT
Tc : H(qTc , φTc) = H(qT , φT )
In our numerical examples, we shall assume that the function R(qs, qT ) is strongly sep-
arable in qs and qT , i.e. R(qs, qT ) = R1(qs)− R2(qT ). Figure 3 plots a conﬁguration of the
phase plane for which the rehabilitation cost function is linear in the two quality levels. Here
too the timing transversality condition can be displayed as an equal areas condition, that
Area NQR equals Area RTUV. Adapting the argument used in the previous two subsections,
it can be shown that the value of the R program is HM/r − αqM .
Applying the same line of reasoning as in the previous subsection, it can be shown that
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if the R program exists, it is more proﬁtable than the S program, and that if the R program
does not exist, the S program is more proﬁtable than any program entailing rehabilitation.
It remains to compare the proﬁtabilities of the R program and the D program, if both exist.
Both start on the φ = α line between where it intersects the right stable arm and the φ˙ = 0
line. The argument employed in the previous subsection to prove that, if the D program
exists, it is more proﬁtable than the S program, can be adapted to prove that if both the
D and the R program exist, the one which starts further to the left on the φ = α line is the
more proﬁtable. An upward shift of the R1(qs) function or a downward shift of the R2(qT )
function reduces the proﬁtability of the R program relative to the S program and the D
program.
In section 4 we shall present a series of related numerical examples, indicating diﬀerent
sets of parameter values for which each of programs S, D, and R, are proﬁt maximizing.
3 The Proﬁt-maximizing Program with Tenancy Rent Control
We model tenancy rent control as a ceiling on the time path of rents over the duration of a
tenancy, conditional on the starting rent12. Letting ps denote the starting rent, u the length
of time into the tenancy, and F (ps, u) (with ∂F/∂ps > 0) the rent control function  the
maximum allowable rent u years into a tenancy, conditional on ps  a tenancy rent control
program imposes the constraint that P̂ (u) ≤ F (ps, u), where P̂ (u) is the rent charged by
the landlord u years into the tenancy.
We shall examine the eﬀects of tenancy rent control applied to a single housing unit
when all other units are uncontrolled; the analysis is therefore partial equilibrium. We make
a number of simplifying assumptions:
Assumption A.1. The length of a tenancy is exogenous at L.
This assumption is made for two reasons. First, we wish to abstract from the eﬀect
of tenancy rent control on tenancy duration, in order to focus on its eﬀects on landlord
12There are tenancy rent control programs that restrict the percentage increase in rent from one year to
the next. Under such a program, a landlord might ﬁnd it proﬁt maximizing to charge less than the maximum
allowable rent increase for some time interval during a tenancy, in which case the ceiling on the time path of
rents would thereafter be determined by the rent level at the time the percentage increase regulation again
becomes binding. Thus, our modeling of tenancy rent control entails a simpliﬁcation.
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maintenance and conversion. Second, the assumption takes into account that tenancy rent
control is invariably accompanied by restrictions on eviction13. Since tenancy rent control
front-end loads rent over a tenancy, shorter tenancies are more proﬁtable for landlords.
In the absence of restrictions on eviction, tenancy rent control would therefore provide
landlords with an incentive to evict tenants14. Under the assumption, the landlord is able
to rehabilitate or to demolish-and-reconstruct only between tenancies.
Assumption A.2. The rent control function is such that the landlord ﬁnds it proﬁt
maximizing to charge the maximum controlled rent over the duration of a tenancy, i.e.
P̂(u) = F (ps , u).
This assumption states that, under the opportunistic program, the time path of con-
trolled rents over a tenancy are suﬃciently front-end loaded relative to the time path of
market rents that the tenancy rent control constraint binds strictly throughout the tenancy.
While not primitive, this assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis since otherwise the pos-
sibility would have to be considered that the rent control constraint binds over some quality
intervals of a tenancy but not over others.
Assumption A.3. Tenants are identical.
Assumption A.4. Tenants face perfect capital markets and discount ﬁnancial ﬂows at the
same rate as the landlord.
With identical tenants, the market rent as a function of quality adjusts so that a renter
receives the same utility at all quality levels. Thus, under tenancy rent control, a tenant is
indiﬀerent between living in a controlled and uncontrolled unit if and only if the discounted
value of controlled rents over the tenancy equals the discounted value of market rents for
the same quality path, discounted at her discount rate. The assumption that the tenant's
discount rate is the same as the landlord's is made to simplify the analysis.
Under the above assumptions, the opportunistic program is independent of the form
of the rent control function. A proof runs as follows. Suppose that the proﬁt-maximizing
13We use the term eviction to mean that the tenant is required to leave her unit even though she would
prefer not to, rather than in the legal sense.
14Tenancy rent control rules out economic eviction (raising rents to force a tenant out) but at least in
North America, where annual tenancies are the norm, a landlord can evict a tenant in some jurisdictions
simply by choosing not to renew the lease, and in others by citing as just causes minor lease violations or
his intention to lease the unit to a family member, convert it to owner occupancy, or rehabilitate it.
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program with a particular rent control function has been solved for. Now modify the rent
control function, holding constant the program but allowing the starting rents for each
tenancy to adjust so that tenants remain indiﬀerent between controlled and uncontrolled
housing. The proﬁtability of the program remains unchanged and the landlord cannot
improve proﬁtability by altering the program. Without ambiguity, we may then let qˆ(u; qs)
denote the time path of quality over a tenancy under the opportunistic program, conditional
on starting quality qs. And the condition that, with the opportunistic program, over each
tenancy the discounted value of controlled rents equals the discounted value of market rents
may be written as
Lˆ
0
F (ps, u)e
−rudu =
Lˆ
0
P (q̂(u; qs))e
−rudu.
Thus, under the above assumptions, it is the imposition of tenancy rent control rather than
its severity15 that matters since it is the imposition of tenancy rent control that undermines
the credibility of the eﬃcient program.
In the analysis of the previous section, without rent control, there were three qualitatively
diﬀerent optimal programs for the landlord, the S program, the D program, and the R
program. The same three qualitatively diﬀerent optimal programs are present under tenancy
rent control.
3.1 Program Ŝ
Program Ŝ under tenancy rent control is the analog of program S in the absence of rent con-
trol. Under our assumptions concerning the characteristics of the maintenance and construc-
tion technologies, program S entails construction followed by downgrading to steady-state
quality. Program Ŝ, too, entails construction followed by downgrading from one tenancy
to the next, but maintenance follows a sawtooth pattern, increasing within each tenancy
15A tenancy rent control program is more severe than another if it permits a lower nominal percentage
increase in rent every year during a tenancy.
Assumption A.2 is that the tenancy rent control program is suﬃciently severe that the landlord
ﬁnds it proﬁt maximizing to charge the maximum controlled rent over the duration of the tenancy. If the
tenancy rent control program is suﬃciently lax that the landlord ﬁnds it proﬁt maximizing to charge the
maximum controlled rent over no portion of the tenancy, the program has no eﬀect. Intermediate situations
are analytically messy.
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and then falling discontinuously from the end of one tenancy to the start of the next. The
program converges to a steady-state tenancy maintenance cycle in which quality is highest
at the beginning and end of each tenancy, rather than to a steady-state quality.
We decompose solution of the opportunistic program under tenancy rent control during
a single tenancy into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we solve the program taking as given
not only the initial quality of the unit and the duration of the tenancy but also the terminal
quality. In the second stage, we solve for the proﬁt-maximizing terminal quality. The
landlord decides on this program after the lease has been signed, and therefore after his
discounted rent over the tenancy has been determined. The ﬁrst-stage problem entails the
minimization of discounted maintenance expenditures needed to achieve terminal quality, qL,
taking as given the starting quality, qs, and the tenancy duration, L. This is an elementary
optimal control program with a well-known solution. Deﬁne J(qs, qL, L) to be the value of
this program. We shall use three properties of the solution:
∂J/∂qs = φ(0) ∂J/∂qL = −φ(L)e−rL φ˙ = rφ− φgq (40)
where φ(t) is the current value of the co-state variable on q˙ = g(q,m). The ﬁrst solution
property indicates that φ(0) is the marginal value of quality at the start of the tenancy, after
the tenancy contract has been signed. The second indicates that φ(L) is the marginal value
of terminal quality at terminal time, so that φ(L)e−rL is the marginal value of terminal
quality discounted to the beginning of the tenancy. Since the ﬁrst stage of the problem
entails deciding on the maintenance path over the tenancy, after the contract has been
signed, we refer to φ as the marginal value of quality via maintenance or the ex post (viz.,
after the tenancy contract has been signed) marginal value of quality. The last solution
property is that over a tenancy the marginal value of quality via maintenance grows16 at
the rate r − gq through the tenancy.
The second stage of the solution of the opportunistic program entails the choice of qL.
To derive this, we work with a value function. Under tenancy rent control, the value of
16Suppose the landlord buys an extra unit of quality today at a price of φ. Instantaneously, he must
make the competitive return on that unit, rφ, and the return comprises two components, the capital gain,
φ˙, minus the depreciation, −φgq.
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a housing unit is a function not only of quality but also of how much time remains in
the current tenancy contract17. Let V̂ (q) denote the value of a housing unit of quality q
between tenancies, and Z(qs) the revenue received over a tenancy contract, discounted to
the beginning of the tenancy contract. The landlord decides on the maintenance program,
and hence qL, after signing the tenancy contract, and therefore after the revenue received
over the tenancy has been determined. Then the value function for V̂ (q) may be written as
V̂ (qs) = Z(qs) +maxqL [J(qs, qL, L) + V̂ (qL)e
−rL]. (41)
Terminal quality is chosen to maximize the expression in square brackets. The corresponding
ﬁrst-order condition is
∂J/∂qL + V̂
′(qL)e−rL = 0. (42)
Comparing the second equation in (40) and (42) yields
φ(L) = V̂ ′(qL). (43)
Diﬀerentiaing (41) with respect to qs yields
V̂ ′(qs) = Z ′(qs) + ∂J/∂qs (using the envelope theorem)
= Z ′(qs) + φ(0). (44)
Eq. (44) requires some care in interpretation. V̂ ′(qs) is the ex ante (before the tenancy
contract has been signed) marginal value of quality at the start of a tenancy, while φ(0) is
the ex post (after the tenancy contract has been signed) marginal value of quality at the
start of a tenancy. Eq. (44) indicates that, at starting quality, the ex ante marginal value of
quality exceeds the ex post marginal value of quality by Z ′(qs), marginal discounted revenue.
Thus, there is a downward jump discontinuity in the marginal value of quality at the time
17Since the housing market remains competitive under rent control, it must still be the case that owning the
program for an increment of time between u and u+du within a tenancy provides income of rV (q(u), u), where
V (q(u), u) is the market value of a controlled housing unit of quality q u units of time into a tenancy. From
this relationship, the rent control function, and the boundary condition that V̂ (qs) = V (qs, 0), V (q(u), u)
may be calculated.
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Figure 4: Phase plane for construction-downgrading to the steady-state cycle under rent
control. Construction cost (α · 105) is $40,000.
the lease is signed. Now return to (43). It states that, in contrast, the marginal value
of quality immediately before the termination of the tenancy equals the marginal value of
quality immediately afterwards, in both cases equaling the increase in the property price
from a unit increase in terminal quality.
The value of the Ŝ program immediately prior to construction is
V̂ Ŝ = max
qc
[
V̂ (qc)− αqc
]
. (45)
Assuming an interior solution, the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximizing
construction quality is
V̂ ′(qc)− α = 0 (46)
Comparing (44) and (46), for the ﬁrst tenancy, since qc = qs,
φ(0) = α− Z ′(qc). (47)
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Construction occurs at that quality level, for which the ex ante marginal value of quality
via construction equals the marginal cost, while the ex post marginal value of construction
quality falls short of marginal construction cost by Z ′(qc).
In the steady state, quality varies within a tenancy, but the starting and terminal qual-
ities remain constant from one tenancy to the next. Let qσ denote the optimal starting and
terminal quality of a steady state cycle. Since in a steady-state tenancy qs = qL = qσ,
V̂ (qσ) =
1
1− e−rL {Z(qσ) + J(qσ, qσ, L)}.
Figure 4 displays the phase diagram of the Ŝ program for the numerical example, and
plots the optimal trajectory for two tenancies, the ﬁrst tenancy that occurs immediately
after construction and the steady-state tenancy. For comparison it also plots the optimal
(stable arm) trajectory without rent control. With the depreciation function we employ,
maintenance expenditures are positively related to φ and independent of q. The diminished
incentive to maintain under tenancy rent control is reﬂected in the lower position, on average,
of the optimal trajectory under tenancy rent control. The incentive under tenancy rent
control to postpone maintenance expenditures towards the end of the tenancy is also evident.
3.2 Program D̂
Program D̂ under tenancy rent control is the analog of program D in the absence of rent
control. Recall that, under our assumptions concerning the construction and maintenance
technologies, program D entails constructing at a quality above saddlepoint quality, down-
grading smoothly to demolition, and then repeating the cycle, which has an endogenous
length of T . Recall, too, that if an optimal demolition program exists, it is more proﬁtable
than the optimal saddlepoint program. The program D̂ diﬀers from program D in two im-
portant respects. First, because of the assumed ﬁxed duration of a tenancy under tenancy
rent control, demolition can occur only between tenancies, so that the length of the demo-
lition cycle must be some integer multiple of L. Thus, there are two types of cycles, the
construction-demolition cycle and the maintenance cycle within each tenancy. Since termi-
nal time is not, therefore, a continuous variable, there will not be a timing transversality
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condition. Instead, optimal cycle length can be computed by comparing the proﬁt obtained
when demolition occurs after every tenancy, after every second tenancy, and so on. Second,
under tenancy rent control the commitment problem arises.
Our solution of the D̂ program proceeds in two stages18. In the ﬁrst stage, the proﬁt-
maximizing program is calculated conditional on the number of tenancies in a construction-
demolition cycle. Let V̂ n(qc) denote the value of a housing unit that has just been con-
structed at quality qc, conditional on n tenancies in the cycle, and Vn the value of the
optimal program conditional on n tenancies within a demolition cycle. In the second stage,
the corresponding proﬁt levels are compared for diﬀerent numbers of tenancies within the
cycle. In this subsection, we ignore the complications that would arise if the non-negativity
constraint on q would bind.
We start by solving for the optimal program, conditional on the unit being demolished
after each tenancy. Once the tenancy contract has been signed, the landlord has no incentive
to maintain. Spending on maintenance does not increase the revenue received over the
tenancy and the value of the structure is zero at the end of the cycle since it is about to be
demolished. The value of the program is
V1 = max
qc
{
V̂ 1(qc)− αqc
}
= max
qc
1
1− e−rL {Z(qc)− αqc},
from which the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximizing construction quality is straight-
forward to obtain.
We now solve for the optimal program, conditional on the structure being demolished
after two tenancies. It is proﬁt maximizing for the landlord to spend nothing on maintenance
during the second tenancy. Let superscript i on q denote the order of tenancy within a
demolition cycle, so that q1L is terminal quality for the ﬁrst tenancy, for example. Then
V̂ 2(qc) = Z(qc) + max
q1L
[J(qc, q
1
L, L) + Z(q
1
L)e
−rL] + (V̂ 2(qc)− αqc)e−2rL.
18Eqs. (41) - (47) apply to the demolition case as well. We proceed as we do in order to provide more
insight into the economics, and to motivate the numerical solution algorithm we employ.
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Thus,
V̂ 2(qc) =
1
1− e−2rL {Z(qc) + maxq1L
[J(qc, q
1
L, L) + Z(q
1
L)e
−rL]− αqce−2rL}.
Calculate ﬁrst Z(q1L). Then solve the maximization problem in square brackets, which yields
q1L as a function of qc, from which an expression for V̂
2(qc) is obtained. Since the value of
the program prior to construction, conditional on construction at quality qc, is V̂
2(qc) −αqc,
the ﬁnal step is to choose qc to maximize V̂
2(qc) −αqc.
This line of reasoning suggests an algorithm for solving for the proﬁt-maximizing program
with n tenancies during a construction-demolition cycle. Let vi(qis, n) be the value of revenue
net of maintenance expenditures received from the beginning of tenancy i until the structure
is demolished, discounted to the beginning of tenancy i, conditional on qis and the number
of tenancies within a demolition cycle. Proceed by backward recursion19. First, calculate
vn(qns , n) ( = Z(q
n
s )). Second, solve
max
qns
J(qn−1s , q
n
s , L) + v
n(qns , n)e
−rL.
Denote by qns (q
n−1
s ) the value of q
n
s that solves this maximization problem, as a function of
qn−1s . Then
vn−1(qn−1s , n) = Z(q
n−1
s ) + J(q
n−1
s , q
n
s (q
n−1
s ), L) + v
n(qns (q
n−1
s ), n)e
−rL.
Return to step 2, but replacing n by n−1, and n−1 by n−2. Proceed recursively backwards
until v1(q1s , n)  the value discounted to construction time of the net revenue received over
the life of the building as a function of q1s = qc, conditional on n tenancies  is obtained.
Then20
Vn = max
qc
1
1− e−rnL {v
1(qc, n)− αqc}.
If the optimal number of tenancies is ﬁnite, then n∗ = arg maxn{Vn}, and Vn∗ is the value
19This algorithm is inapplicable to the optimal saddlepoint program, since the optimal saddlepoint program
contains an inﬁnite number of tenancies.
20Alternatively, we may write V̂ n(qc) = v
1(qc, n) + (−αqc + V̂ n(qc))e−rnL, and obtain Vn as the value of
V̂ n(qc)− αqc maximized with respect to qc.
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Figure 5: Phase plane for a demolition cycle under tenancy rent control. Construction cost
(α · 105) is $30,000.
of the D̂ program. If the optimal number of tenancies is inﬁnite, we say that an optimal
demolition program does not exist.
Figure 5 plots one cycle of the D̂ program for the numerical example for which the
proﬁt-maximizing number of tenancies within a demolition cycle is four. Note that φ = 0
throughout the last tenancy.
3.3 Program R̂
Program R̂ under rent control is the analog of program R in the absence of rent control.
Recall that, under our assumptions concerning the construction and maintenance technolo-
gies, program R entails constructing at quality qc above saddlepoint quality, downgrading
the unit to quality qT , upgrading it via rehabilitation to quality qs, downgrading it along the
original trajectory from qs to qT , and then repeating the rehabilitation cycle ad inﬁnitum.
We also showed that if program R exists, it is more proﬁtable than program S, and that,
if both program R and program D exist, the one with the lower construction quality is
the more proﬁtable. Program R̂ diﬀers from program R in two respects. First, because
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under tenancy rent control rehabilitation is permitted only between tenancies and because
tenancy duration is L, the period from initial construction to the ﬁrst rehabilitation must
be some integer multiple of L, as must the period between subsequent rehabilitations. Be-
cause of this, the starting and terminal quality of a rehabilitation cycle will in general vary
from one rehabilitation to the next. Second, as with the other two rent control programs,
downgrading does not occur smoothly because of the commitment problem.
In the optimal demolition program with rent control, all the cycles are the same. This
is not in general true of the optimal rehabilitation program; the number of tenancies may
be diﬀerent for diﬀerent rehabilitation cycles. In our numerical examples, however, since we
assume that the marginal beneﬁt of increasing quality via rehabilitation is independent of
the quality level from which rehabilitation is undertaken, the ﬁrst rehabilitation is followed
by the stationary rehabilitation cycle. In this case, the construction of a solution algorithm
is relatively straightforward. First, one solve for the opportunistic stationary rehabilitation
cycle, conditional on one, two, etc. tenancies between rehabilitations, and then for the
unconditional opportunistic stationary cycle. And second, solve for the optimal program up
to the ﬁrst rehabilitation, conditional on one, two, etc. tenancies to that point, and then
for the unconditional optimal program.
Among the Ŝ, D̂, and R̂ programs, the overall optimal program is the one with the
highest value. The deadweight loss due to rent control is simply the diﬀerence between the
value of the optimal program without rent control minus the value of the optimal program
with rent control.
4 Numerical Examples
This section presents a series of related numerical examples with the aim of quantifying the
eﬀects of tenancy rent control. The eﬃciency cost caused by the commitment problem is of
special interest.
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Figure 6: Phase plane for a rehabilitation cycle under tenancy rent control. Construction
cost (α · 105) is $20,000.
4.1 Choice of functional forms and parameters
We had hoped to draw on the empirical literature in our choice of functional forms and
parameters. Unfortunately, there seem to be no empirical studies that have employed the
Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983) conceptual framework as the basis for empirical anal-
ysis. As a result, we adopt the more modest goal of developing numerical examples whose
parameters and functional forms are reasonable. We choose the functional forms so as to
obtain equations of motion that are the solutions to linear diﬀerential equations, as well as
(for the case of rent control) closed-form value functions. And we choose the parameters to
generate plausible results for the steady-state, demolition, and rehabilitation programs.
As in the theoretical analysis, we measure quality as proportional to construction costs.
We assume the following functional forms for the rent function, the construction cost func-
tion, and the maintenance/depreciation function:
P (q) = eq − fq
2
2
C(q) = α q˙ = −δq + 2am1/2
55
The rent equation generates a linear, downward-sloping marginal-willingness-to-pay-for-
quality function. The maintenance/depreciation function is about the simplest possible.
In the absence of maintenance, quality depreciates exponentially at the rate δ. A given level
of maintenance expenditure slows down the rate of quality depreciation by an amount that
is independent of quality, and there are diminishing returns to maintenance. The optimal
expenditure on maintenance is given by a2φ2; maintenance expenditure is therefore increas-
ing in φ and independent of q. Substituting the expression for optimal maintenance into the
depreciation function gives the maximized depreciation function,
q˙ = −δq + 2a2φ. (48)
In the absence of rent control, these equations imply a co-state equation of the form
φ˙ = (r + δ)φ− e− fq, (49)
and with tenancy rent control21,
φ˙ = (r + δ)φ. (50)
In the absence of rent control, these equations of motion correspond to a phase plane
with a linear, upward-sloping q˙ = 0 line and a linear, downward-sloping φ˙ = 0 line, whose
intersection point, the saddlepoint is at
qS =
2a2e
δ(r + δ) + 2a2f
φ =
eδ
δ(r + δ) + 2a2f
.
With rent control, the φ˙ = 0 line coincides with the q-axis, so that the q˙ = 0 and φ˙ = 0
lines do not intersect in the interior of the phase plane.
We take as our units of measurement years and hundreds of thousands of dollars. We
21Thus, both with and without rent control, the state and co-state equations are together a pair of linear
ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations in q and φ. In the absence of rent control, substituting one into the other
generates linear, second-order diﬀerential equations for q alone and φ alone. And with rent control, (50) is
a linear, ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation in φ alone, and substituting the solution to (50) into (48) results in
a linear, ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation in q alone.
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start by setting the following parameters:
δ = 0.03, r = 0.0375, a = 0.2121, e = 0.055, f = 0.005, and L = 10.
These parameters imply a saddlepoint quality of 2.0, saddlepoint maintenance of 0.02 ($2000
per year), saddlepoint rent of 0.10 ($10000 per year), and a value of the co-state variable
(the marginal value of quality) at the saddlepoint of 0.667. α is varied across examples.
Our rehabilitation function has a very simple form: R(qs, qT ) = β1qs − β2qT = β2(qs −
qT )− (β1−β2)qs, where β1 = 0.25, β2 = 0.24. Thus, besides a linear cost of quality upgrade,
the landlord has to pay a fee proportional to the `target' quality qs.
4.2 Numerical solution procedures
The details of the numerical solution procedures employed are presented in the Appendix.
Here we just describe in broad terms the general approaches. In the absence of rent control,
the solution procedure centers on solving for the solution parameters of the second-order
linear diﬀerential equation for φ, since everything else may be solved for once these param-
eters are obtained. One parameter is obtained from the initial condition that φ(0) = α.
How the other parameter is determined depends on the type of program. In the case of
the saddlepoint program, the second parameter is obtained from the φ-coordinate of the
saddlepoint; in the case of the demolition program, the second parameter and the period
of the demolition cycle are solved simultaneously from φ(T ) = 0 and the terminal time (or
equal-areas) transversality condition; in the case of the rehabilitation program, the second
parameter, as well as φs and φT , are solved simultaneously from the transversality conditions
for φs, φT , and the terminal time transversality condition.
The approaches taken to solve the optimal programs with tenancy rent control are more
complex. It is convenient to express the unknown parameters in the functions φ(t) and
q(t) in terms of q(0) and q(L). This allows us to obtain the discounted revenue received
over a tenancy, Z(q0), and the net value of a tenancy cycle, J(q0, qL, L). For program
Ŝ, we make a conjecture about the form of V̂ (q). Then, using (42) to ﬁnd qL(qs) and
plugging it into (41), we apply the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to solve for V̂ (q).
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The ﬁnal step is to ﬁnd the construction quality qc using (46). The solution algorithm
for the demolition program with rent control was described in Section 3.2 and that for the
rehabilitation program sketched in Section 3.3.
4.3 Examples without rehabilitation
In this subsection, we assume that rehabilitation is unproﬁtable and that α is not so high as
to make initial construction unproﬁtable. In the absence of rent control, the optimal program
is therefore either the optimal saddlepoint program or the optimal demolition program, with
the saddlepoint program being optimal for α above 0.4166 and the demolition program for
α below that level. With rent control, the optimal program entails either convergence to
a steady-state cycle or a demolition program, with the former occurring when construction
costs are high relative to maintenance. We proceed by lowering α from one example to the
next.
 α = 0.695
The fourth panel of Figure 7 displays the phase diagram for this example, both with
and without rent control. The φ˙ = 0 locus in the absence of rent control is shown as
the dotted line; with rent control, it coincides with the q-axis. Recall that the level of
maintenance is proportional to φ. In the absence of rent control, the optimal program
entails construction at q = 1.416, followed by upgrading to steady-state quality, qS = 2.0.
Construction occurs at that quality at which the marginal value of quality, α, equals the
marginal cost of construction. The value of the program is 0.751. With rent control, the
optimal program entails a steady-state tenancy cycle, with construction at q = 1.542. As
explained earlier, φ jumps downwards discontinuously immediately after a tenancy contract
is signed, reﬂecting the commitment problem, and then rises continuously within the tenancy.
With increasing maintenance over the tenancy, quality initially falls and then rises until it
reaches construction quality by the end of the tenancy. The value of the program is 0.694.
Thus, the eﬃciency loss due to tenancy rent control is 7.6% of the value of the uncontrolled
program. Observe that the average quality of housing is lower under rent control, consistent
with intuition.
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Figure 7: Phase planes with and without rent control. No rehabilitation.
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 α = 0.667
The third panel of Figure 7 shows the optimal trajectories for this example without and
with rent control. The optimal program in the absence of rent control entails constructing at
saddlepoint quality and holding quality constant at that level. The value of the Hamiltonian
at the saddlepoint is 0.08 (rent of 0.10 minus maintenance costs of 0.02 and of course no
depreciation). Housing value is 2.133 and construction costs are 1.333, so that the value of
the program prior to construction is 0.800 and the land to housing value ratio 0.375. Are
these numbers reasonable? The cap rate (the percentage of net rent to value) is low, under
the model's assumptions simply equaling the interest rate; if uncertainty and property taxes
were considered, the cap rate would be reasonable. Maintenance expenditures are 0.94% of
housing value, which accords broadly with the 1-percent rule that maintenance expenditures
are typically about 1% of property value. The Figure shows two rent-control trajectories.
The path on the right is for the ﬁrst tenancy, that on the left for the steady-state tenancy.
Construction occurs just above saddlepoint quality. Maintenance increases within each
tenancy, but starting quality falls from one tenancy to the next, converging to steady-state
starting quality below saddlepoint quality. The value of the program is 0.746, implying a
deadweight loss due to tenancy rent control of 6.8% of value.
 α = 0.4
It was noted earlier that, with the assumed functional forms and parameter values, in
the absence of rent control the optimal demolition program is more proﬁtable than the
optimal saddlepoint program when α is below 0.4166. Thus, in this example, displayed in
the second panel of Figure 7, the optimal program without rent control is a demolition cycle.
Construction occurs at a quality considerably above saddlepoint quality. This is followed by
downgrading to demolition quality, at which point the structure is demolished and the cycle
exactly repeated. The value of the program is 2.058. In contrast, with tenancy rent control,
convergence to a steady-state cycle remains optimal22. Construction occurs at high initial
22The critical construction cost level below which the optimal program entails demolition is therefore
lower with rent control than without. With α = 0.4, the deadweight loss due to the commitment problem
is therefore higher with the optimal demolition program than with the optimal steady-state program.
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Panel A: Value of the optimal Panel B: Absolute deadweight Panel C: Relative deadweight
programs without rent control as a loss due to rent control, $105 loss due to rent control, %
function of construction cost, $105
Figure 8: Values of optimal programs without rent control,
and deadweight loss due to rent control - Case without rehabilitation
quality, followed by downgrading from one tenancy to the next (but with rising maintenance
within each tenancy) converging to a steady-state cycle. The value of the program is 2.030,
so that in this case the deadweight loss due to rent control is only 1.4% of the uncontrolled
program value.
 α = 0.1
In this example, shown in the ﬁrst panel of Figure 7, construction is suﬃciently cheap
relative to maintenance that a demolition cycle is proﬁt maximizing both with and without
rent control. The range of qualities over a demolition cycle is similar for the two programs.
The level of maintenance is lower under rent control at every quality level; as a result,
depreciation is more rapid and the demolition cycle shorter. The values of the program
without and with rent control are 5.663 and 5.549, respectively, implying a deadweight loss
due to rent control of 2.0% of the value of the uncontrolled program.
Figure 8 focuses on the deadweight loss resulting from the application of rent control.
Panel A shows the value of the optimal program without rent control as a function of α.
There is a slope discontinuity in the value of this optimal program at α = 0.4166, where the
switch occurs between the range of qualities where the saddlepoint program is optimal and
where the demolition cycle is optimal. There are several slope discontinuities in the value
of the optimal program with rent control.23 The one corresponding to the highest value of
α corresponds to the switch point between the range of qualities for which the steady-state
23This function is not drawn since to the naked eye, it is hard to distinguish for that drawn in Panel A.
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Panel A: Values of the optimal Panel B: Absolute deadweight Panel C: Relative deadweight
programs without rent control as a loss due to rent control, $105 loss due to rent control, %
function of construction cost, $105
Figure 9: Values of optimal programs without rent control,
and deadweight loss due to rent control - Case with rehabilitation
cycle is optimal and for which the demolition cycle is optimal. The ones at lower values of
α correspond to switch points for which diﬀerent numbers of tenancies within a demolition
cycle are optimal. Panel B shows the absolute loss in program value from the application of
tenancy rent control, and Panel C the corresponding proportional loss.
4.4 Examples with rehabilitation
In examples with rehabilitation, we consider a limited range of α (0 < α < 0.24). Due to
our choice of the functional form, for higher values of α construction becomes unreasonably
expensive compared to rehabilitation. Figure 9 presents the value of the optimal program
without rent control as a function of α, and the absolute and relative deadweight loss due
to rent control.
For α ≤ 0.112 the optimal program with or without rent control is demolition (programs
D and D̂). Under rent control: for α ≤ 0.011, the D̂ program has only one tenancy cycle
between demolitions; for 0.011 < α ≤ 0.077, two tenancy cycles; and for 0.077 < α ≤ 0.112,
three tenancy cycles. This explains the non-smoothness of deadweight loss when demolition
is optimal. For 0.112 < α ≤ 0.141, D is still the optimal program without rent control
but under rent control rehabilitation is more proﬁtable. For 0.141 < α ≤ 0.24, the optimal
program is rehabilitation with or without rent control. For 0.141 < α ≤ 0.168, the R̂
program entails three tenancies before the ﬁrst rehab, while for 0.168 < α ≤ 0.24 only
two tenancies precede the ﬁrst rehab. As a result, there is a `kink' in panels B and C at
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α = 0.168. At these relatively low values of α steady-state programs are never optimal.
The relative loss is limited and does not exceed 2.5% of the value of an optimal program.
Absolute loss may reach $12,000 per unit per year.
5 Conclusion
In recent years an increasing number of jurisdictions around the world have adopted what
has come to be known as tenancy rent control, typically as a method of partial decontrol of
a previously stricter form of rent control. Under tenancy rent control, rents are controlled
within a tenancy but are free to vary between tenancies. Tenancy rent control appears
attractive, as a way of providing security of tenure to sitting tenants without the excess
demand distortions created by stricter control programs. How attractive tenancy rent control
in fact is depends on the magnitude of the distortions it creates. Since tenancy rent control
typically results in the contract rent exceeding the market rent in the early years of the
tenancy and falling short of it in later years, it provides an incentive for tenants to stay in
their apartments longer than they otherwise would. In this paper we examined the eﬀects
of tenancy rent control on a landlord's choice of the quality path of his housing units, which
includes his decisions on construction quality, maintenance, rehabilitation, and demolition
and reconstruction, under the assumptions that tenancy duration is exogenous and that
the controls are applied to only a single housing unit. We showed that the application of
tenancy rent control gives rise to a potential commitment (or time inconsistency) failure. We
contrasted two programs, the eﬃcient program and the opportunistic program. The eﬃcient
program is the proﬁt-maximizing program in the absence of rent control. The opportunistic
program is the proﬁt-maximizing program over a tenancy once the tenancy contract has
been signed. The signing of the contract results in the present value of revenue from the
tenancy being independent of the landlord's maintenance expenditure, and hence reduces
his incentives to maintain. Before the tenancy contract is signed, the landlord would like to
commit to following the eﬃcient program, but none of the commitment mechanisms available
 contract, reputation, and regulation  is likely to be very eﬀective. In our analysis, we
assumed that these mechanisms are completely ineﬀective, so that the landlord follows the
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opportunistic program. Building on the Arnott-Davidson-Pines model of housing quality
and maintenance, we compared the properties of the eﬃcient and opportunistic programs.
Section 4 presented a series of related numerical examples, with the aim of quantifying the
deadweight loss due to the commitment failure. For reasonable parameter values, we found
that the deadweight loss is modest but not insigniﬁcant, ranging from zero to eight percent
of the pre-control value of the program.
There are several open questions left for future research.
1. The paper considered the application of tenancy rent control to a single housing unit
when the rest of the market is uncontrolled. How do the results change when the entire
market is controlled?
2. The paper built on the Arnott-Davidson-Pines ﬁltering model. Since there is no empir-
ical work based on this model, the numerical examples used simple functional forms and
reasonable parameter values. How would the results change if estimated functional forms
were used instead?
3. The paper assumed, under tenancy rent control, that tenancy duration is exogenous. But,
by front-end loading rents, tenancy rent control should increase tenancy duration. How im-
portant is this distortion compared to the commitment-in-maintenance distortion considered
here, and how do the two distortions interact?
4. The paper noted that tenancy rent control improves security of tenure for tenants. What
is the social value of doing so?
5. The paper compared the unrestricted market equilibrium to the market equilibrium un-
der tenancy rent control. But since tenancy rent control has typically been employed as a
method of partial decontrol, it is perhaps more relevant to ask: What is the magnitude of
the eﬃciency gain when a stricter form of rent control is replaced by tenancy rent control?
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Appendix
In this appendix we ﬁnd optimal programs without and with rent control assuming the
functional forms used in our numerical examples. As was stated in Section 4, in the nu-
merical examples we employ the following rent function, construction cost function, and
maintenance/depreciation function:
P (q) = eq − fq
2
2
= 0.055q − 0.005q
2
2
C(q) = αq
q˙ = −δq + 2am1/2 = −0.03q + 2(0.045φ2)1/2.
No-rent-control programs
We start by solving the system of diﬀerential equations (20) and (21):
q˙ = −δq + 2a2φ,
φ˙ = (r + δ)φ− e+ fq.
This system can be reformulated as follows:
φ¨− rφ˙− (2a2f + δ(r + δ))φ+ δe = 0,
q =
φ˙+ e− φ(r + δ)
f
. (51)
The solution to the second order diﬀerential equation for φ has the following form:
φ(t) = C1e
γ1t + C2e
γ2t +B (52)
where
B =
δe
2a2f + δ(r + δ)
= φS ,
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γ1 =
r +
√
r2 + 4(2a2f + δ(r + δ))
2
,
γ2 =
r −√r2 + 4(2a2f + δ(r + δ))
2
.
With φ(t), we can ﬁnd q(t) using (51):
q(t) =
1
f
[
C1e
γ1t(γ1 − r − δ) + C2eγ2t(γ2 − r − δ) + e−B(r + δ)
]
.
Recalling that
qS =
2a2e
δ(r + δ) + 2a2f
and rearranging e−B(r+δ)f , we obtain that
q(t) =
1
f
[C1e
γ1t(γ1 − r − δ) + C2eγ2t(γ2 − r − δ)] + qS . (53)
Whether the S or D program is optimal, the transversality condition (6) holds:
φ(0) = α.
Using this condition, we solve for C2:
C1 + C2 + φ
S = α,
C2 = α− C1 − φS .
The other transversality condition that allows us to solve for C1 is diﬀerent for the S and
D programs, which we consider in turn.
Program S
The steady-state program implies that
lim
t→∞ q(t) = q
S (54)
lim
t→∞φ(t) = φ
S .
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Notice that γ1 > 0 while γ2 < 0. Therefore, (54) can hold only if C1 = 0. This condition
completely deﬁnes q(t) and φ(t):
φ(t) = C2e
γ2t + φS ,
q(t) =
1
f
C2e
γ2t(γ2 − r − δ) + qS ,
C2 = α− φS .
Program D
To ﬁnd C1, we use the transversality condition φ(T ) = 0:
C1e
γ1T + C2e
γ2T +B = 0,
C1 = −B + C2e
γ2T
eγ1T
.
The last unknown is T . It is determined by the equal-areas condition:
H(T ) = H(0)− rαq(0) (55)
where
H(t) = eq(t)− fq(t)
2
2
+ a2φ(t)2 − δq(t)φ(t). (56)
Equation (55) involves sums of exponents of T , so it cannot be solved analytically. We
ﬁnd its solution numerically for a given value of α. It appears that this equation has two
solutions in the region where T is positive. We choose the one that results in the higher
value of the program.
Program R
Our rehabilitation technology is R(qs, qT ) = 0.25qs − 0.24qT . In this problem, there are two
diﬀerent pairs of laws of motion for q and φ, {qc(t), φc(t)} for a tenancy immediately after
construction, which we call a construction cycle, and the other, {q(t), φ(t)}, for all subse-
quent tenancies, which we call rehabilitation cycles. Both pairs are described by (53) and
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(52), respectively, but with diﬀerent unknown constants, which we will denote as {Cc1, Cc2}
for a construction cycle and {C1, C2} for rehabilitation cycles. We start by ﬁnding the laws
of motion for rehabilitation cycles. The transversality conditions
φ(0) =
∂R(qs, qT )
∂qs
= 0.25,
φ(T ) = −∂R(qs, qT )
∂qT
= 0.24
allow us to solve for the unknown constants on which q(t) and φ(t) depend. Then we ﬁnd
the optimal duration of the rehabilitation cycle T , using the equal-area condition:
(H(0)−H(T ))/r = R(q(0), q(T )). (57)
Here H(·) is deﬁned in (56) and depends on the laws of motion for the rehabilitation cycle.
We solve this equation numerically using Maple 9.5 and obtain that the optimal duration of
the rehabilitation cycle is (approx.) 16.61 years. We verify that there are no other solutions
for positive T by examining behavior of the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (57).
Notice that T does not depend on the cost of construction. Then we ﬁnd the laws of motion
qc(T ) and φc(T ) for the construction cycle using the following transversality conditions:
φc(0) = α,
φc(Tc) = φ(T ).
Finally, we numerically solve for the length of the construction cycle Tc for each speciﬁc α
using the following equation:
qc(Tc) = q(T ).
69
Programs with rent control
Under programs with rent control, the diﬀerential equation for φ is diﬀerent from that
without rent control. Solving the system (20) and (22)
q˙ = −δq + 2a2φ,
φ˙ = (r + δ)φ,
we obtain the following solutions:
φ(t) = c1e
(r+δ)t,
q(t) =
2a2c1
r + 2δ
e(r+δ)t + c2e
−δt.
We solve for c1 and c2 in terms of initial and terminal quality of a tenancy cycle, qs and qL:
q(0) =
2a2c1
r + 2δ
+ c2 = qs,
c2 = q0 − 2a
2c1
r + 2δ
.
Since the analytical solutions to programs with rent control contain quite messy expressions,
we give only solutions for the values of parameters used in our numerical examples and round
all values to the third digit.
q(t) =
qL − qse−δL
e(r+δ)L − e−δL
(
e(r+δ)t − e−δt
)
+ q0e
−δt
= 0.817(e0.0675t − e0.03t)qL + (−0.606e0.0675t + 1.606e0.03t)qs ,
φ(t) = c1e
(r+δ)t =
(
qL − qse−δL
)
(r + 2δ)(
e(r+δ)L − e−δL) 2a2 e(r+δ)t
= (−0.656qs + 0.886qL)e0.0675t.
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Recall that optimal maintenance is m(t) = a2φ2. Thus, the value of a tenancy cycle is
J(qs, qL, L) = −
ˆ L
0
m(t)e−rtdt = −
ˆ L
0
a2φ(t)2e−rtdt.
It is straightforward to calculate the integral from the righthand side but the expression is
cumbersome; for exposition purposes, we just say that J(qs, qL, L) can be presented in the
following form:
J(qs, qL, L) = G1q
2
s +G2q
2
L +G3qsqL.
where G1, G2, and G3 are some known functions of parameters.
Using the deﬁnition of the rent function P (·), we also calculate the discounted present
value of rent received over a tenancy:
Z(qs, L) =
ˆ L
0
[eqˆ (t; qs)− f
2
q̂ (t; qs)
2]e−rtdt,
with
qˆ (t; qs) =
qL(qs)− qse−δL
e(r+δ)L − e−δL
(
e(r+δ)t − e−δt
)
+ qse
−δt
where a ﬁnal quality of a cycle, qL(qs), is optimally chosen and is a function of an initial
quality of a cycle, qs. The functional form of q(t) implies that
Z(qs, L) = B1q
2
s +B2qL(qs)
2 +B3qsqL(qs) +B4qs +B5qL(qs).
Again, {Bi}5i=1 are some known functions of the parameters.
Program Ŝ
In case of the Ŝ program, the problem of the landlord boils down to an inﬁnite horizon
dynamic programming problem, in which the state variable is the initial quality while the
control variable is the terminal quality of a unit. Thus, we have the following Bellman
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equation:
V̂ (qis) = Z(q
i
s) + max
qiL
[J(qis, q
i
L, L) + V̂ (q
i+1
s )e
−rL] (58)
s.t. qi+1s = q
i
L, i = 1, 2, ... is the number of the tenancy cycle.
We apply the `guess-and-verify' method. Notice that J is quadratic in qiL. If q
i
L is a linear
function of qis, then Z is also quadratic in q
i
L. Notice also that q
i
L is a linear function of q
i
s
if V̂ is quadratic. Thus, we make a guess that V̂ is quadratic:
V̂ (q) = A0 +A1q +A2q
2. (59)
We ﬁnd A0, A1 and A2 by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. First we need to ﬁnd
qiL as a function of q
i
s. Assuming that J(q
i
s, q
i
L, L) + V̂ (q
i+1
s )e
−rL is concave, we use the ﬁrst
order condition:
∂
∂qiL
[
J(qis, q
i
L, L) + V̂ (q
i+1
s )e
−rL
]
= 2G2q
i
L +G3q
i
s + e
−rLA1 + 2e−rLA2qiL = 0,
qiL = −
G3q
i
s + e
−rLA1
2(G2 + e−rLA2)
≡ K1qis +K2. (60)
Substituting (59) and (60) into the Bellman equation (58) and suppressing the index for the
cycle i, we obtain
A0 +A1qs +A2(qs)
2 = B1q
2
s +B2(K1qs +K2)
2 +B3qs(K1qs +K2) (61)
+B4qs +B5(K1qs +K2)
+G1q
2
s +G2(K1qs +K2)
2 +G3qs(K1qs +K2)
+ e−rL[A0 +A1(K1qs +K2) +A2(K1qs +K2)2].
One can see that (61) is quadratic in qs. We ﬁnd the unknown constants A0, A1 and A2 by
rewriting (61) in the form
W0 +W1qs +W2q
2
s = 0
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and solving the system
W0 = 0 (62)
W1 = 0
W2 = 0
for A0, A1 and A2.
After some simpliﬁcation and rounding, the system (62) can be rewritten as
A2 + 0.336 +
0.779
1.375A2 − 1.195 +
0.473− 0.539A2
(1.375A2 − 1.195)2 = 0
A1 − 0.254 + 0.175 + 1.213A1
1.375A2 − 1.195 +
0.734A1 − 0.837A1A2
(1.375A2 − 1.195)2 = 0
0.313A0 +
0.136A1 + 0.472A
2
1
1.375A2 − 1.195 +
0.285A21 + 0.325A2A
2
1
(1.375A2 − 1.195)2 = 0.
This system of (cubic) equations has three solutions:
A0 = 3.012, A1 = −1.634, A2 = 0.567,
A0 = 34.012, A1 = −12.235, A2 = 0.861,
A0 = 0.635, A1 = 0.772, A2 = −0.025.
Only the third solution results in a concave value function while other solutions have A2 > 0.
Indeed, one can check that the ﬁrst and second solutions are spurious, since they result in
convex J(qis, q
i
L, L) + V̂ (q
i+1
s )e
−rL. We proceed further with the third solution
V̂ (q) = 0.635 + 0.772q − 0.025q2.
To complete the solution of the problem, we use the the ﬁrst-order condition for the maxi-
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mization of the value of the program:
d
dq0
(
−αq0 + V̂ (q0)
)
= −α+A1 − 2A2q0 = 0.
Therefore,
q0 =
A1 − α
2A2
.
Program D̂
Recall that program D̂ entails an inﬁnite number of repetitions of a contruction-demolition
cycle, each of which comprises of n tenancy cycles. Conditional on pursuing program D̂,
the problem of the landlord is not only to choose an optimal trajectory for each tenancy
cycle but also to choose optimal n. Given n, the problem of the landlord is to ﬁnd the
optimal maintenance path and optimal construction quality. To ﬁnd optimal maintenance,
the landlord solves a ﬁnite-horizon dynamic programming problem similar to (58):
v(qis) = Z(q
i
s) + max
qiL
[J(qis, q
i
L, L) + v(q
i+1
s )e
−rL], (63)
s.t. qi+1s = q
i
L, i = 1, 2, ..n is the number of the tenancy cycle,
v(qn+1s ) = 0.
Given our particular functional form, we show the solution for n = 1. v(q2s) = 0, so q
1
L is a
solution to the ﬁrst-order condition:
d
dq1L
[−0.328(q10)2 + 0.886q1Lq10 − 0.598(q1L)2] = 0.
Thus,
q1L = 0.741q
1
0.
Given q1L,
v(q1s) = 0.4q
1
s − 0.016(q1s)2.
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Knowing v(q1s), the landlord optimizes with respect to q
1
s :
max
q1s
(−αq1s + v(q1s)), (64)
which gives
q1s = −31.31α+ 12.522. (65)
The value of program D̂ for n = 1 is
V̂ 1(q1s) =
1
1− e−rL (v
1(q1s , 1)− αq1s)
= −40.044α+ 16.016− (0.051 + 3.198α)(−31.31α+ 12.522).
Following the same strategy we solve for V̂ n(q1s) for n from 1 to 20.
One more complication we encounter is that for suﬃciently high values of α (for α > 0.55)
the non-negativity condition q ≥ 0 binds for an optimal D̂ program. We say that the
demolition program under rent control does not exist for α > 0.55 given our choice of
functional forms and parameters.
Program R̂
The proﬁt-maximizing rehabilitation program under tenancy rent control requires ﬁnding
the sequence of initial and terminal qualities in each tenancy cycle that maximizes the
landlord's net income stream and solves:
max
{qis,qiL}∞i=1
[−αq1s + Z(q1s) + J(q1s , q1L, L)
+
∞∑
i=2
e−(i−1)rL(−(R(qis, qiL))+ + Z(qis) + J
(
qis, q
i
L, L
)
)]
where (x)+ = x if x > 0 and (x)+ = 0 if x ≤ 0. The superscripts on q stand for the number
of the tenancy cycle. In this case the main problem is to guess the solution. We make two
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conjectures. First, consider the following value function:
W (q1s) = max
q1L,{qis,qiL}∞i=2
[−αq1s + Z(q1s) + J(q1s , q1L, L)
+
∞∑
i=2
e−(i−1)rL(−(R(qis, qiL))+ + Z(qis) + J
(
qis, q
i
L, L
)
)].
Our ﬁrst conjecture is that W (·) is quadratic. This is suggested by the functional form
of Z(·) and J(·, ·) which are quadratic. But even knowing that W (·) is quadratic is not
suﬃcient to get the complete solution as there is another issue: when does the landlord
rehabilitate and when not? We look for the program that has the following form:
−αq1s +
M∑
i=1
e−(i−1)rL
[
Z(qis) + J(q
i
s, q
i
L, L)
]
+ e−MrLV̂ K(qML )
where
V̂ K(qML ) =
∞∑
j=1
e−(j−1)rKLY (qML ;K)
and
Y (qML ;K) = −R(qM+1s , qML ) +
K∑
i=1
e−(i−1)rL
[
Z(qM+is ) + J(q
M+i
s , q
M+i
L )
]
.
Thus we are looking for programs that have two parts, a `non-stationary' and a `stationary'
one. A stationary part V̂ (qML ;K) consists of inﬁnite repetition of the same cycle Y (q
M
L ;K),
which starts with rehabilitation followed by K tenancy cycles without rehabilitation. The
non-stationary part of the program is the initial part, which comprises M tenancy cycles
without rehabilitation.
To ﬁnd V K(qML ), we consider the following system:
V1(q
0
L;K) = max
q1s
[−R(q1s , q0L) + V2(q1s ;K)], (66)
V2(q
1
s ;K) = Z(q
1
s) + max
q1L
[J(q1s , q
1
L) + e
−rLV3(q1L;K)], (67)
...
VK+1(q
K
s ;K) = Z(q
K
s ) + maxqLK
[J(qKs , q
K
L ) + e
−rLV1(qKL ;K)], (68)
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qis = q
i−1
L , i = 2, ..K.
Assuming that Vi, i = 1, ..,K + 1 is quadratic (Vi(x;K) = Ai +Bix+Cix
2), one can notice
that we have two types of equations. Let us examine the optimal choices for each equation
type. First, we consider maximization in equation (66).
max
qs1
[−β1q1s + β2q0L +A2 +B2q1s + C2(q1s)2].
Provided that C2 < 0,
q1s =
β1 −B2
2C2
,
i.e. q1s is just a constant. Note that q
1
s would be a constant when the rehabilitation function
is additively separable in its two arguments. Additive separability of the rehabilitation
function implies that as soon as the landlord ﬁnds it proﬁtable to rehabilitate for the ﬁrst
time, the system loses memory about its history. This fact suggests that the solution indeed
should contain a stationary cycle of the kind described above. Also, the loss of memory
after rehabilitation implies that the non-stationary part of the solution may not contain
rehabilitation and, therefore, necessarily consists of a sequence of tenancy cycles without
rehabilitation.
Given that Vi(x) = Ai+Bix+Cix
2, it is straightforward to obtain the solutions to (67)-
(68). We do not present the explicit solutions as they involve quite cumbersome expressions.
Having obtained the solutions for optimal choices of the q's, we substitute them into the
system(66)-(68) and construct a new system that has 3(K + 1) equations in the coeﬃcients
on Vi(·), i = 1, ...,K+1. The properties of the system that we obtain are described in Table
1.
Fortunately, this system boils down to linear equations and has a solution. First, we
solve for C1, then for CK+1, CK , ..., C2. Then we are able to solve for B1 and combining this
solution with solutions for C1 we solve for BK+1, BK , ..., B2. Substituting all these solutions
into the the rest of equations involving Ai's, we obtain a system of linear equations that has
exactly one solution. Having the solution for the stationary part of the problem, it is easy
to solve the problem completely by working backwards starting from the stationary part.
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Equation for the coeﬃcient on
q0 q q2
Variables that enter the equation
linearly nonlinearly linearly nonlinearly linearly nonlinearly
Eq. 1 A1, AK+1 B2, C2 B1  C1 
Eq. 2 A2, A3 B3, C3 B2 B3, C3 C2 C3
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eq. K + 1 AK+1, A1 BK+1, CK+1 BK+1 B1, C1 CK+1 C1
Table 1: Properties of the system of equations for the coeﬃcients of value functions
To ﬁnd the optimal program, the programs with K,M = 1, 2, ..., 20 were considered. It
appears that, under the chosen values of parameters, the stationary part of the program
has two tenancies in one rehabilitation cycle. The optimal number of tenancies in the non-
stationary part depends on α and can be 2 or 3.
Depending on α, the value function for this program has the following form:
V̂ =

6.887− 15.103α+ 10.554α2,
if 0.003 < α ≤ 0.168, (3 tenancies in a non-stationary cycle)
6.851− 15.056α+ 11.527α2,
if 0.168 < α ≤ 0.25 (2 tenancies in a non-stationary cycle)
(we do not consider α > 0.24). It is clear why we have more non-stationary cycles for lower
α : the lower the cost of construction, the higher the initial quality the landlord chooses and
the longer it takes to downgrade to the quality where it is proﬁtable to rehabilitate. Figure
6 shows the optimal trajectories for α = 0.2.
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